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OLYMPIC GAME HOST SELECTION AND THE LAW:
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
RYAN GAUTHIER*
The process used to select the hosts of the Olympic Games is under in-
creased scrutiny due to the withdrawal of many cities from the 2022 Winter
Olympic Games host selection process and the selection of hosts with question-
able human rights records. Scholarship, particularly legal scholarship, exam-
ining the hosting of the Olympic Games is rapidly increasing. Absent from
much of this scholarship is a thorough examination of the host selection
process. Understanding the host selection process is crucial when considering
issues faced by host cities as many of the issues can be traced back to the host
selection process.
This article examines the process used to select the hosts of the Olympic
Games, focusing on legal issues addressed by the host selection process. A
qualitative analysis of the questions asked by the International Olympic
Committee (‘IOC’) of cities that bid to host the Olympic Games, and their
responses to those questions, is the core of this article. The article asks what
the role of law is in the host selection process and whether legal issues are
integral to the selection of a host for the Olympic Games. The results of the
qualitative analysis are used to frame future research for discussing reform
of the host selection process, namely to include human rights protections.
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I. INTRODUCTIONS
Prior to the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games, local
shops wanted to “get into the spirit” of the Games.  Butcher shops
arranged their sausages in the shape and color of the Olympic
Rings, while florists did the same.  However, these actions often ran
afoul of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act,1 and
the shops were asked by authorities to cease-and-desist.2  The
London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act was not an attempt
by the United Kingdom government to crack down on Olympic cel-
ebration, but was a legislative package passed to honor the promises
1. London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act, 2006, c. 12 (U.K.).
2. See Jere´ Longman, Where Even Sausage Rings Are Put on the Chopping Block,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, at B11.
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London (and the U.K.) made when it won the rights to host the
Olympic Games in 2005.  One such promise was to prevent ambush
marketing, the implementation of which perhaps went overboard.3
Studies of the Olympic Games have greatly expanded across
disciplines over the past decade.  Yet, the legal aspects of the
Olympic Games remain under-explored.  Authors working in other
disciplines have touched on legal issues.  As discussed in Part II,
concern has been raised over how the Olympic Games may impede
the exercise of civil rights, such as the freedom of speech, or over
broader concerns associated with an increasingly “securitized” state.
Other concerns have been expressed over zoning provisions that
would facilitate the removal of marginalized groups, and reductions
in labor and environmental protections on Olympic-related con-
struction sites.
Legal studies of the Olympic Games focus on the laws enacted
by a particular hosting city and state.  Some of these studies are of a
general nature, such as the examination of the London Olympic and
Paralympic Games Act by Mark James and Guy Osborn.4  Other stud-
ies have focused more closely on an individual area of law, usually
intellectual property law. Such studies were done for Beijing 2008,
Vancouver 2010, London 2012, and Rio 2016.
I hope to expand upon the prior legal studies, while also de-
parting from them, by examining the process used to choose the
host of the Olympic Games.  The International Olympic Committee
(“IOC”) selects the host of the Olympic Games from several candi-
dates through a process where the IOC sets out requirements to
host the Olympic Games and the cities vying to host the Games re-
spond by submitting bids.  The host selection process that the IOC
uses is a two-stage process, set out in the Olympic Charter.5  The
core of each of these stages is arguably the questionnaires that the
IOC requires aspiring host cities to answer.  In the first stage, for-
mally titled the “Candidature Acceptance Procedure,” the IOC ac-
cepts bids from cities interested in the Olympic Games.  These
cities submit the answers to the IOC’s questionnaire, which as of
3. See generally Ryan Gauthier, Major Event Legislation: Lessons from London and
Looking Forward, 14 INT’L SPORTS L.J. 58 (2014).
4. Mark James & Guy Osborn, London 2012 and the Impact of the UK’s Olympic
and Paralympic Legislation: Protecting Commerce or Preserving Culture?, 74 MODERN L.
REV. 410 (2011).
5. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER, R. 33 (Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter
OLYMPIC CHARTER], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%20
Charter/Olympic_Charter_through_time/2013-Olympic_Charter.pdf.
3
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2020, comprised of 105 questions.6  These cities are known as “Ap-
plicant Cities.” Following an evaluation by the IOC, cities that do
not perform well enough are eliminated, and the remainder move
on to the “Candidature Procedure.”  The remaining cities, known
as “Candidate Cities,” also answer an IOC questionnaire, which in-
cludes 164 questions (and numerous more sub-questions).7  Follow-
ing a second evaluation by the IOC, the one hundred or so
members of the IOC then vote to select the host city.  Upon the
selection of the host city, the IOC and the host city sign a contract
specifying the rights and responsibilities of the parties.  A prelimi-
nary phase, the “Invitation” phase, is taking place as of host selec-
tion for the 2024 Summer Olympic Games.8
The host selection process has come under particular scrutiny
in recent years, for a few reasons.  First, the selection of a host for
the 2022 Winter Olympic Games has been nothing short of disas-
trous for the IOC. What looked to be a promising field of Munich,
St. Moritz, Stockholm, Oslo, Krakow, Lviv, Beijing, and Almaty was
swiftly decimated as bids were defeated by public referenda (Mu-
nich, St. Moritz, and Krakow), geopolitical events (Lviv), and by
governments refusing to support the bid (Stockholm, Oslo).  With
only Beijing and Almaty bidding to host the 2022 Winter Olympic
Games, the Games are already being tagged as “the Games nobody
wants.”9  Oslo’s withdraw was particularly poignant as it was the last
European city to withdraw, and upon its withdrawal, oversaw a back-
lash over the IOC’s demands throughout the host selection process
(although many of the demands were issues of protocol addressed
in the “Technical Manuals” used for Games preparation, not in the
6. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE: GAMES
OF THE XXXII OLYMPIAD (2011) [hereinafter 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PRO-
CEDURE], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/
2020_CAP.pdf.
7. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE AND QUESTIONNAIRE:
GAMES OF THE XXXII OLYMPIAD (2012) [hereinafter 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCE-
DURE], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/FI-
NAL-2020-CPQ-May-2012x.pdf.
8. 2024 Bid Process Gets Underway with New Invitation Phase as IOC Begins to Im-
plement Olympic Agenda 2020 Reforms, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM. (Jan. 15, 2005), http://
www.olympic.org/news/2024-bid-process-gets-underway-with-new-invitation-phase-
as-ioc-begins-to-implement-olympic-agenda-2020-reforms/242779.
9. See Brian Blickenstaff, Nobody Wants to Host the Olympics, VICE SPORTS (Nov.
13, 2014), https://sports.vice.com/article/nobody-wants-to-host-the-olympics; Lisa
Abend, Why Nobody Wants to Host the 2022 Winter Olympics, TIME (Oct. 3, 2014),
http://time.com/3462070/olympics-winter-2022/; The 2022 Winter Olympics: the
Games Nobody Wants to Host, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2014), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/sport/2014/may/28/winter-olympics-2022-games-nobody-wants; Barry
Petchesky, Nobody Wants to Host the 2022 Olympics, DEADSPIN (May 27, 2014), http://
deadspin.com/nobody-wants-to-host-the-2022-olympics-1582151092.
4
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host selection process itself).10  Second, Sochi, the host of the 2014
Winter Olympic Games, was met with reports of human rights
abuses, including displacement of persons and poor treatment of
migrant workers.  Combined with concerns over human rights
abuses in Qatar, a bidder to host the Olympic Games in 2016 and
2020, and host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the problems
faced in Beijing during the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, con-
cerns have been raised over the selection of hosts with poor human
rights records.  Finally, the IOC recently underwent a reform pro-
cess, titled Agenda 2020, which, despite hopes for significant re-
form, made minimal changes to the host selection process, namely
adding the “invitation phase.”11
This article hopes to advance the current discourse around the
host selection process via a thorough examination of issues of state
law that are raised throughout the host selection process.  By exam-
ining the host selection process, this article seeks to answer three
research questions.  First, what issues of a state’s public law come
into play during the host selection process?  More specifically, what
changes in state law does the IOC request or require of states whose
cities are bidding to host the Olympic Games?  Also, how do bid-
ders respond to these requests and requirements?
Second, are the legal issues raised in the bidding process an
integral part of a bid, or are they mere background concerns as
suggested by others, discussed below?  In answering this question, it
is also asked whether bids differentiate themselves from other bids,
by perhaps promising more changes, or particular legislative pack-
ages attractive to the IOC.
Third, what lessons can be drawn from the current host selec-
tion process, and the IOC’s requests and requirements for legal
changes, for advocates of substantive reform—namely the inclusion
of human rights protections—for the host selection process?  In or-
der to suggest changes to a process, one should understand the pro-
cess they want to change.  However, this article will not address
procedural reform to the host selection process.12
10. See Feargus O’Sullivan, Oslo Didn’t Really Want the 2022 Winter Olympics,
CITYLAB (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/10/oslo-doesnt-
want-the-2022-winter-olympics/381133/.
11. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., AGENDA 2020: CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND (Dec. 9,
2014) [hereinafter AGENDA 2020], available at http://www.olympic.org/docu-
ments/olympic_agenda_2020/olympic_agenda_2020-context_and_background-
eng.pdf.
12. Issues of procedural reform have been addressed by this author in a prior
work, and will be part of the author’s upcoming Ph.D. dissertation. See Ryan
5
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This article will not attempt to evaluate the quality of the bids
submitted, nor will it engage in any form of prediction as to what
makes a bid successful.  The IOC’s Working Group for Applicant
Cities and the Evaluation Commission for Candidate Cities summa-
rize and evaluate the bids, and are far more qualified to do so due
to their expertise and proximity to the IOC.  In addition, other
studies have attempted to predict which bids would be successful,
and have met with mixed results.13
The remainder of this article will proceed in six parts. Part II
outlines the relevant literature.  Part III delineates the scope of in-
quiry. Part IV discusses the methodology of qualitative data analysis
that is used to examine the bids.  Part V analyzes the bids by legal
theme addressed, discussing the background questions, and high-
lighting the questions that relate to changes in public law.  Part VI
discusses the implications of the data, and of the methods used, for
future research.  Part VII concludes by emphasizing the possibilities
for future research.
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Literature examining the Olympic Games relevant to this arti-
cle can be split into two bodies: law and the Olympic Games, and
literature from other disciplines that focuses on bidding to host the
Games.  In regards to law and the Olympic Games, one legal study
has examined the role of law in bidding to host the Olympic
Games, in passing.  In their article, Stephen A. Stuart and Teresa
Scassa outline the guarantees required by the IOC in the Candida-
Gauthier, International Sporting Event Bid Processes and How They Can Be Improved,
INT’L SPORTS L.J., no. 1–2, 2011, at 3.
13. See Arne Feddersen, Wolfgang Maennig & Phillip Zimmermann, How to
Win the Olympic Games – The Empirics of Key Success Factors of Olympic Bids (Univ. of
Hamburg, Hamburg Contemporary Economic Discussions No. 2, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Feddersen et al., How to Win the Olympic Games], available at http://www
.hced.uni-hamburg.de/WorkingPapers/200702.pdf.  This study examined a variety
of quantitative factors such as the host city’s population, gross domestic product,
etc., and found that only the distance of the Olympic Village from the sporting
venues, average temperature, and the number of hotel beds within fifty minutes of
the venues to be statistically significant variables. Id. at 11. See Arne Feddersen &
Wolfgang Maennig, Determinants of Successful Bidding for Mega Events: The Case of the
Olympic Winter Games, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF MEGA
SPORTING EVENTS 70 (Wolfgang Maennig & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2012) [herein-
after Feddersen & Maennig, Determinants of Successful Bidding for Mega Events].  This
study examined some similar factors and some new factors related to the prior
study as applied to the Winter Olympics, and found a much higher significance
amongst the variables.
6
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ture Procedure of the host selection process.14  They do so to argue
that the IOC could use its clout to improve post-Games sus-
tainability,15 but point out that most of the guarantees protect the
IOC’s intellectual property rights, and by extension its commercial
interests.16  Stuart and Scassa do not address the broader role of
public law in the bids, outside of the guarantees, nor do they ex-
amine how the hosts respond to these guarantees.  Otherwise, liter-
ature on law and the Olympic Games focuses on legislation passed
to support the hosting of the Olympic Games, leaving aside bidding
to host the Olympic Games.17
Literature on bidding to host the Games tends to fall into four
categories: (1) personal anecdotes;18 (2) discussing the value pro-
position of hosting the Games;19 (3) deconstructing a failed bid;20
or (4) attempting to determine factors influencing the success of a
bid.21  Aside from the personal anecdotes, these studies are usually
conducted from a political science or an economics perspective.
14. Stephen A. Stuart & Teresa Scassa, Legal Guarantees for Olympic Legacy, 9
ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 1, para. 7 (2011), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume9/stuart/stuart_scassa.pdf.
15. Id. paras. 4–5.
16. Id. para. 15.
17. See, e.g., James & Osborn, supra note 4; Carlos E. Bacalao-Fleury, Note,
Brazil’s Olympic Trials: An Overview of the Intellectual Property Challenges Posed by the
2016 Rio de Janeiro Games, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 191 (2011); Teresa
Scassa, Faster, Higher, Stronger: The Protection of Olympic and Paralympic Marks Leading
Up to Vancouver 2010, 41 U.B.C. L. REV. 31 (2008).
18. See, e.g., JOHN FURLONG WITH GARY MASON, PATRIOT HEARTS: INSIDE THE
OLYMPICS THAT CHANGED A COUNTRY 56–77 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Stephen B. Billings & J. Scott Holliday, Should Cities Go for the Gold?
The Long-Term Impacts of Hosting the Olympics, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 754 (2012); Richard
Pomfret, John K. Wilson, & Bernhard Lobmayr, Bidding for Sport Mega-Events (Univ.
of Adelaide, School of Economics Working Paper Series No. 0089, 2009), available
at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.167.7867&rep=rep1
&type=pdf; John R. Gold & Margaret M. Gold, Olympic Cities: Regeneration, City
Rebranding and Changing Urban Agendas, 2 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 300 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, An Analysis of the Political
Economy for Bidding for the Summer Olympic Games: Lessons from the Chicago 2016 Bid, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF MEGA SPORTING EVENTS 85
(Wolfgang Maennig & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2012); Kamilla Swart & Urmilla Bob,
The Seductive Discourse of Development: The Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid, 25 THIRD
WORLD QUARTERLY 1311 (2004); Noam Shoval, A New Phase in the Competition for the
Olympic Gold: The London and New York Bids for the 2012 Games, 24 J. URB. AFF. 583
(2002); Christopher R. Hill, The Politics of Manchester’s Olympic Bid, 47 PARLIAMEN-
TARY AFF. 338 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Feddersen & Maennig, Determinants of Successful Bidding for Mega
Events, supra note 13; Feddersen et al., How to Win the Olympic Games, supra note 13;
Hans M. Westerbeek, Paul Turner & Lynley Ingerson, Key Success Factors in Bidding
for Hallmark Sporting Events, 19 INT’L MKTG. REV. 303, 309 (2002) [hereinafter Wes-
terbeek et al., Key Success Factors]; P.R. Emery, Bidding to Host a Major Sports Event:
The Local Organising Committee Perspective, 15 INT’L. J. PUB. SECTOR MGMT. 316
7
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Law’s absence from the bidding literature may be because it is
seen as a “background” factor in bidding to host the Olympic
Games.  This view is highlighted in Christer Persson’s qualitative
study The Olympic Games Site Decision.22  Examining the selection of
the 2002 Winter Olympic Games host, Persson surveyed the bidders
involved, as well as the IOC members who voted on those Games.
The survey asked respondents to grade the level of importance of
bid components (e.g., sports facilities, finances, transportation in-
frastructure).23  Persson did not include “legal aspects” as he felt
they “do not constitute messages that distinguish one winning bid
from the another [sic], but are basic requirements to qualify the
bids for further evaluation.”24  Another study, carried out by Hans
M. Westerbeek, et al., surveyed a variety of international sporting
organizations.25  The central question asked was: “How important is
the issue presented in the following statement, when aiming to at-
tract a hallmark sporting event to a city.”26  The study suggested
various factors, such as political support, and bid team composition.
Any mention of “legal aspects,” or something of a similar nature,
was absent.
Legal studies of the Olympic Games have not addressed the
bids submitted to host the Games, while research on bidding to
host the Games has declared that legal aspects are a background
component.  As a result, an area that comprises a significant com-
ponent of hosting the Olympic Games, not to mention an entire
section of both the Candidature Acceptance and Candidature Pro-
cedures set forth by the IOC, has been ignored.  This study aims to
remedy this situation, filling the gap of bidding to host the Olympic
Games and its impact on law.
(2002); Lynley Ingerson & Hans M. Westerbeek, Determining Key Success Criteria for
Attracting Hallmark Sporting Events, 3 PAC. TOURISM REV. 239 (1999) [hereinafter
Ingerson & Westerbeek, Determining Key Success Criteria].
22. Christer Persson, The Olympic Games Site Decision, 23 TOURISM MGMT. 27
(2002) [hereinafter Persson, The Olympic Games Site Decision].  See also Christer Per-
sson, The Olympic Host Selection Process (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Lulea˚ University of Technology), available at http://pure.ltu.se/portal/files/10285
1764/LTU_DT_0037_SE.pdf.
23. Persson, The Olympic Games Site Decision, supra note 22, at 30–31.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Westerbeek et al., Key Success Factors, supra note 21.
26. Id. at 309 (citing Ingerson & Westerbeek, Determining Key Success Criteria,
supra note 21).
8
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III. SCOPE OF INQUIRY
To answer the research questions posed in this article, I will
examine changes in state-level public law requested or required by
the IOC in its questionnaires, and the responses by bidding cities,
for the Olympic Games from 2012–20.  Thus, the elements framing
the scope of this article are: “state public law,” “years of examina-
tion,” and “documents to be consulted.”
A. State Public Law
Although it is cities, not countries, which bid for the right to
host the Games, the commitment of the state government is essen-
tial.  Most of the questions of a legal nature that are asked by the
IOC address state law, not local law.  Therefore, the level of analysis
for this article is the highest level of government in a country, re-
ferred to here as the “state.”  Regional governments may be taken
into consideration when appropriate, such as in a case where all but
one bidder addressed a particular law at the state level, but one
bidder addressed such laws through provincial jurisdiction. In such
a case, it is more useful to include the outlier, rather than eliminate
the bid from consideration simply due to this jurisdictional issue.
This inclusionary policy also holds for super-national law, namely
when European Union law trumps national legislation.  By focusing
on the state, areas of truly local concern, such as altering traffic
patterns or enacting sign ordinances are excluded.  Sometimes
these issues are taken up in federal legislation enacted in support of
the Olympic Games, but to avoid getting bogged down in minutiae
the same guidelines as above are used: if the issue is normally a
local issue, even if it is applied at a different level by some bidders,
then it is excluded.27
Since the state is the unit of analysis, the focus of the type of
law is predictably, “public law.”  “Public law” is defined as either the
“body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals
and the government,” or “[a] statute affecting the general pub-
lic.”28  The research questions guiding this article ask about legisla-
tion passed as a result of the Olympic Games, inherently limiting
the scope to matters of public law.  Therefore, issues of private law
that arise during the Olympic Games, such as contracts entered
27. For instance, the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act,
2006, c. 12 (U.K.) spends much space ensuring that the Olympic Delivery Author-
ity could create and implement an Olympic Transportation Plan, including imple-
menting road closures. Id. §§ 10–18.
28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).
9
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into between sponsors and the Organising Committees for the
Olympic Games (“OCOGs”), are not considered.
Also not considered are issues that are not reasonably foresee-
able from the questions and answers given in the bidding process.
For instance, prior to the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games, a group
of female ski jumpers filed a lawsuit against the Vancouver Olympic
Games Organising Committee (“VANOC”).29  The IOC had deter-
mined that ski jumping events would take place for men, but not
for women.  The jumpers sued VANOC (not the IOC), alleging a
violation of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms,30 which provides for equal benefit of the law regardless of,
inter alia, sex.31  This case, at least in part, was predicated upon pub-
lic law.  However, it is unreasonable to expect bidders to anticipate
these sorts of lawsuits, arising because of an IOC decision made
more than three years after awarding Vancouver the right to host
the Games.32
B. Years of Examination
The Games of 2012–2020 are selected for analysis based upon
the evolution of the host selection process used by the IOC.33  The
modern, two-stage process of host selection has been around since
at least the selection of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, which was
completed in 1995.  However, in late 1998, corruption amongst the
IOC members during the selection of Salt Lake City as the host of
the 2002 Games was revealed.34  As part of the IOC’s reforms fol-
lowing the “Salt Lake City Scandal,” the host selection process was
also addressed.  Of particular interest to this study, the reforms al-
tered IOC questionnaires beginning with the 2008 Summer
29. Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing Comm. for the 2010 Olympic &
Paralympic Winter Games (2009), 2009 BCSC 942, 98 B.C.L.R. 4th 141 (Can.).
30. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 15(1).
31. The British Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed the case, holding that
the Charter did not apply to VANOC as it was not a governmental body, and be-
cause hosting particular events under the Olympics banner was not “furthering any
Canadian government policy or program.”  Sagen v. Vancouver Organizing
Comm. for the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic Winter Games (2009), 2009 BCCA 522
(Can.) at para. 49.
32. See id. at paras. 13, 18.
33. The years referred to will refer to the year of the Olympic Games that are
being bid upon.  If a year is cited that does not relate to a bid, but relates to a
calendar year in which a particular action takes place, it will be indicated so.
34. See, e.g., Thomas A. Hamilton, The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The
2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 219
(2010); INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC CRISIS AND REFORM CHRONOLOGY (1999), avail-
able at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_590.pdf.
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Olympic Games.35  As of the selection of the host for the 2012 Sum-
mer Olympic Games, the questionnaires have largely stabilized in
form and content and can be used for comparison.  The year 2020
was selected as the end point as the selection process for the 2020
Summer Olympic Games took place in 2013, and coincided with
the time period that the research was conducted.
The host selection process for the years examined can briefly
be described as follows.  First, a city submits an initial bid to the
IOC about nine years prior to the Games.  These bids are based
upon questions asked by the IOC, discussed below.  These cities are
known as Applicant Cities.  The IOC establishes an ad-hoc Working
Group to evaluate the bids, scoring the bids by category.36  Those
bids that meet the minimum requirements continue through the
host selection process.  These remaining cities then submit a sec-
ond round of bids, also based on questions asked by the IOC, which
are more in-depth.  These cities are known as Candidate Cities.
These bids are evaluated by the IOC’s Evaluation Commission.  The
Evaluation Commission does not score the bids, although for the
2022 host selection process (not discussed in this article), the Com-
mission was asked to provide a “risk assessment.”37  Finally, the IOC
Session (the general membership of the IOC) votes to select the
host of the Games from the Candidate Cities, requiring the selected
city to receive a majority of votes.
CITIES THAT BID TO HOST THE OLYMPIC GAMES:
2012–2020
Games Bid for
City Name Country (Candidate Cities)
Almaty Kazakhstan 2012
Annecy France 2018
Baku Azerbaijan 2016, 2020
Borjomi Georgia 2014
Chicago United States of America 2016
Doha Qatar 2016, 2020
Havana Cuba 2012
Istanbul Turkey 2012, 2020
Jaca Spain 2014
Leipzig Germany 2012
35. See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., FACTSHEET: HOST CITY ELECTION 2 (2013), avail-
able at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_documents_Factsheets/
2020-Host_City_Election.pdf.
36. Although in the years 2012–2018, the Working Group also provided an
aggregate score for the entire bid.
37. AGENDA 2020, supra note 11, at 18.
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London United Kingdom 2012
Madrid Spain 2012, 2016, 2020
Moscow Russia 2012
Munich Germany 2018
New York City United States of America 2012
Paris France 2012
Prague Czech Republic 2016
PeyongChang South Korea 2014, 2018
Rio de Janeiro Brazil 2012, 2016
Rome Italy 2020 (Abandoned)
Salzburg Austria 2014
Sochi Russia 2014
Sofia Bulgaria 2014
Tokyo Japan 2016, 2020
Using the bids for 2012–20 allows for a manageable sample size
of thirty-two bids to host the Summer and Winter Olympic Games.
These bids represent twenty-four cities in nineteen countries.  All
include bids at the “Applicant City” stage, while eighteen bids
moved on to the second stage of the host selection process, becom-
ing “Candidate Cities.”  The eighteen Candidate Cities represent
fourteen cities from eleven countries.  These numbers, thirty-two
and eighteen, are the general sample sizes for many of the answers
to the IOC’s questions.  However, some of the IOC’s questions were
asked of Candidate Cities from 2012–18, and Applicant Cities dur-
ing the 2020 bidding process.  In these cases, the sample size will be
twenty-one bids (fifteen Candidate Cities, and six Applicant Cities).
When referring to bids, the terms “bids” and “bidders” will be used,
as well as “Applicant Cities” and “Candidate Cities” to differentiate
the different steps in the host selection process.  When the study
refers to cities or states as the unit of analysis, the distinction of
“cities” or “states/countries” will be made.
This sample also includes a bid by Rome for the 2020 Summer
Olympic Games, which is marked as “abandoned.”  Rome had in-
tended to bid on the 2020 Games, but abandoned the bid on the
eve of the deadline for the submission of the Applicant City bids
due to a decision by the government to not support a bid for the
Games while engaging in austerity economics.38  Aside from the
government guarantees regarding funding, Rome’s bid documenta-
tion is otherwise generally complete.  Therefore, the contents of
Rome’s bid are useful for this study.
38. Rome is now considering a 2024 Olympic Bid. See Andrew Dampf, Rome
2024 Olympic Bid Could Also Involve Vatican, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 15, 2014, availa-
ble at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2014/Rome_2024_Olympic_bid_could_also
_involve_Vatican/id-e4b69b19053a45509ad589c6518bd4f3.
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For this analysis, the decision has been made to treat each bid
as a separate unit.  As can be seen in the chart above, there are
more bids than there are cities and countries.  This discrepancy re-
sults because some cities bid multiple times to host the Olympic
Games, and some countries have multiple cities bidding over time.
Seven of the nineteen cities have bid multiple times, with two cities
bidding three times.  Four of the eleven countries have also had
bids originating from different cities within the country.  The
choice has been made to use “bids” instead of “cities” or “states” for
three reasons.  First, the purpose of this thesis is to examine bids,
via the bid books, not cities.  Second, prior studies, particularly em-
pirical studies, have used “bids” as opposed to cities.39  Third, using
“bids” allows the analysis to capture the changes, or lack thereof,
across the years that are made by those who bid multiple times.
A risk of this approach is that multiple bids originating from
the same city, or bids originating from the same country, would
have similar or even identical responses to the IOC questionnaires,
and could skew the results.  For instance, Madrid unsuccessfully bid
three times, while London successfully bid once.  Yet, if these two
cities answered a question differently, Madrid’s bids, if they did not
change their responses, would “count” more than London’s one
response.  Additionally, if all instances of possible identical re-
sponses were eliminated, then sections of the European bids that
acknowledge the primacy of European Union law would have to be
excluded as well.  Fortunately, the use of qualitative analysis with
this sample size enables the addressing of these types of situations
in the analysis.  In the example used above, it would be acknowl-
edged that all three divergent responses come from one particular
city, providing context to the responses.
C. The Documents
The primary documents used in this article are the IOC ques-
tionnaires and the “bid books” submitted by the cities in response.
As these documents establish a “question-and-answer” format, this
article will follow suit.  Questions come from the Candidature Ac-
ceptance Procedures and the Candidature Procedures developed
by the IOC setting forth their formal requirements in bidding to
host the Olympic Games.  These Procedures were obtained from
39. See Feddersen & Maennig, Determinants of Successful Bidding for Mega Events,
supra note 13, at 72; Feddersen et al., How to Win the Olympic Games, supra note 13,
at 7–8.
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the IOC’s website.40  Answers come from the application files, or
“bid books,” submitted by each Applicant and Candidate City for
each Olympic Games that they are applying to host.41  These bid
books were obtained from the Olympic Library in Lausanne, Swit-
zerland, or online through the IOC Collection of the Re´seau des
bibiothe`ques de Suisse occidentalle,42 with the exception of Rome’s
2020 bid, which was obtained through a different website.43
Beyond the questionnaires and bid books, other IOC docu-
ments have also been consulted as secondary sources of informa-
tion.  Following the evaluation of the Applicant and Candidate
Cities, the IOC publishes a set of Working Group Reports and Eval-
uation Commission Reports, respectively.  These reports are ob-
tained from the IOC’s website.  The Working Group Reports
recommend whether or not Applicant Cities should move on to be-
come Candidate Cities, sometimes by assigning scores, but as of the
2020 Games, absent a score.44  Evaluation Commission Reports are
somewhat of an “executive summary” of the bids submitted by the
Candidate Cities.  These formats mean that new publicly available
information outside of the bid books is scarce, except in some situa-
tions, such as when a site visit clarifies previous statements.  The
reports will be used to reveal if any of the guarantees granted by the
bidders were sub-standard, as the precise text of most of the guaran-
tees were not included in the bid books, but in a separate “guaran-
tee file,” which was often unobtainable.  The reports will also be
40. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Host City Elections, Documents, OLYMPICS.ORG,
http://www.olympic.org/host-city-elections/documents-reports-studies-publica-
tions (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (listing select “Host City Elections” for selection of
procedures from 2008–24).
41. The term “bid book,” while somewhat colloquial, will be used throughout
this article.  The books are referred to as “Replies to the IOC Questionnaire,” “Ap-
plication File,” and “Candidature Acceptance Application,” amongst others.  Thus,
the term “bid book” will be adopted as shorthand for citation.  The citation format
that will be used for the bid books will be as follows: City, Year, Candidature Ac-
ceptance Procedure (Applicant City) or Candidature Procedure (Candidate City),
volume number (if applicable), page number.  For instance, if the author cites to a
provision in Doha’s bid book that speaks about restrictions on the press (or ab-
sence thereof) for the 2020 Games, it would be cited as: Doha 2020, Applicant City,
76.  The use of supra will be avoided for clarity.
42. Digital Library – IOC Olympic Studies Centre, RE´RO DOC, http://doc.rero.ch/
collection/CIO?ln=en (last visited October 10, 2012).
43. See Rome 2020, Applicant City, available at http://www.olympic.org/Docu-
ments/Reports/EN/en_report_590.pdf.
44. See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., REPORT BY THE IOC CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE
WORKING GROUP, Games of the XXXII Olympiad in 2020 7 (2011) [hereinafter
2020 WORKING GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/
Host_city_elections/Final-report-2020-Working-Group-English.pdf.
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used to clarify information, or to reveal any strong IOC reactions to
responses.
D. The Questions
The bulk of the IOC Questionnaires consists of the IOC setting
forth questions to or requirements for the bidding cities.  Some of
these questions asked by the IOC take the form of an actual ques-
tion: “What are the existing laws, if any, in your country that relate
to sport?”45  Some of them read as an implied question: “Describe
the regulations in force in your country regarding immigration and
entry visas.”46  Others read like an order: “Provide a guarantee from
the relevant authorities to provide all security, medical, customs,
immigration and other government-related services at no cost to
the Organising Committee (OCOG).”47  Regardless of the manner
of wording, these statements by the IOC will be referred to as “ques-
tions” throughout this article for ease of reference.
This article is interested in the change of legislation brought
about by hosting the Olympic Games.  Thus, questions that request
or require changes in legislation by potential hosts will be the focus.
There are forty-two questions and sub-questions across the Appli-
cant City and Candidate City procedures that can be said to directly
refer to state-level public law issues.48  During the analysis, ques-
tions that request changes will be highlighted in bold for ease of
reference.
IV. METHODOLOGY
To answer the research questions above, the questionnaires
that the IOC asks of the bidders, and the bidders’ response to those
questions are analyzed.  To undertake this analysis of the bidders’
responses, I will conduct a qualitative document analysis of the bids
from 2010–2020.  Qualitative document analysis is a “systematic
procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents” that examines
data to “elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical
knowledge.”49  The analysis of the documents “yields data . . . that
are then organized into major themes, categories, and case exam-
45. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 93.
46. Id. at 94.
47. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 84.
48. See infra Appendix I.
49. Glenn A. Bowen, Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, 9
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH J., no. 2, 2009, at 27.
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ples specifically through content analysis.”50  Procedurally, qualita-
tive document analysis follows three steps that are inspired by the
school of grounded theory: immersion into the data, data reduc-
tion, and interpretation of the data.51  When the researchers re-
ceive the data, they begin to skim or review the data to get a general
idea of what is in the documents.  Once there is familiarity with the
documents, data reduction/coding may begin.  Often, as the re-
search progresses, new information comes to light, or needs to be
interpreted differently, and the data units or codes change.52  Fi-
nally, interpretation of the data is carried out.
In regards to the present research, the author consulted six
particular documents to immerse himself in the data.  To under-
stand the types of questions asked by the IOC, the author consulted
the IOC questionnaires for the 2018 Candidate Cities, and the 2020
Applicant Cities, as these were the most recent questionnaires avail-
able.  To understand the answers that might be provided by the
bidders, the author reviewed two bids submitted by the 2018 Candi-
date Cities (PyeongChang and Munich), and two bids submitted by
2020 Applicant Cities (Doha and Tokyo).  Data reduction was
guided by the IOC’s organization of the questionnaire across dis-
tinct themes.  Thus, questions were categorized according to those
themes, with a few exceptions, detailed below.  The questions were
analyzed as discrete units. In vivo coding, where the researcher uses
a key word or phrase recurring throughout the question, was relied
upon for initial, and in some cases, final coding of the responses to
the questions.  The codes were analyzed for similarities and differ-
ences, and responses have been so grouped for the analysis.
This study is novel in that it uses a qualitative methodology to
study the bids submitted to host the Olympic Games, instead of a
quantitative methodology.  Prior studies examining the selection of
Olympic host cities have used both qualitative and quantitative anal-
ysis with mixed results.  The qualitative studies used surveys,53 while
the quantitative studies relied on pre-existing documentation, most
50. Id. at 28.
51. See Jane Forman & Laura Damschroder, Qualitative Content Analysis, in EM-
PIRICAL METHODS FOR BIOETHICS: A PRIMER 39, 46 (Liva Jacoby & Laura A. Siminoff
eds., 2008); see also Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 926, 944 (Peter Cane &
Herbert Kritzer eds., 2010); Bowen, supra note 49, at 32.
52. See Webley, supra note 51, at 944.
53. See Persson, The Olympic Games Site Decision, supra note 22, at 30; Wes-
terbeek et al., Key Success Factors, supra note 21, at 312.
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particularly on the bid books.54  Given the two options, qualitative
analysis is preferred for three reasons: the inductive nature of the
study, the reliance on nominal variables, and the small sample size.
First, qualitative analysis is well-suited to inductive analysis, where
general principles are derived from an observation of data, while
quantitative analysis is more suited to testing a hypothesis by mea-
suring correlation and causation.55  Since this thesis is determining
what is required of bidders and what their responses are, and then
deriving principles for further evaluation, qualitative analysis is pre-
ferred.  Second, studies that use quantitative analysis tend to use at
least some variables that are classified as ordinal, interval, or ratio
variables.56  These are variables that have some sort of rank-order-
ing to them, such as population, income, or even preference indica-
tion (e.g., “on a scale of 1–10, please rank how you feel about X”).
These variables permit analyses that test correlation amongst vari-
ables, the heart of quantitative analysis.  These sorts of variables are
used in the studies that sought to determine which factors were pre-
dictive of a bidder being selected as a host city of the Olympic
Games.57  On the other hand, the variables used in this study are
nominal variables.  Nominal variables are those that have no rank-
ordering, (i.e., no category is greater or lesser than the other).
These sorts of variables lend themselves to qualitative analysis, par-
ticularly when there are no quantitative variables involved.  Third,
the small sample size of only thirty-two bids allows for qualitative
analysis, whereas a larger sample size would cause one to lean to-
wards using quantitative analysis.
In spite of the benefits of using qualitative document analysis,
concerns do arise with validity and reliability.  The potential validity
weakness is that the documents themselves may not reflect objective
reality.  This is a common concern with the use of documents as
every document created serves some primary purpose, and that pur-
pose is generally not to aid researchers.58  In the case of bids to the
54. See Feddersen & Maennig, Determinants of Successful Bidding for Mega Events,
supra note 13, at 74; Feddersen et al., How to Win the Olympic Games, supra note 13,
at 7–8.
55. Webley, supra note 51, at 928–29.  The dividing line between qualitative
and quantitative analysis is not a clear-cut distinction. See id. at 930.
56. EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 137–39 (11th ed. 2007).
These are variables such as preference ranking, population, distance, or Gross Do-
mestic Product that have some sort of rank-order. Id.
57. See Feddersen & Maennig, Determinants of Successful Bidding for Mega Events,
supra note 13, at 74–77; Feddersen et al., How to Win the Olympic Games, supra note
13, at 8–10.
58. See Bowen, supra note 49, at 33; see also Webley, supra note 51, at 939.
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Olympic Games, the documents were created as a source of infor-
mation for the IOC, but also to present the city as a viable and at-
tractive host of the Olympic Games.  With this in mind, one might
ask whether the bidders might stretch the truth, or even outright
lie, to gain a competitive advantage in the cutthroat race to host the
Games.  Related is the concern that the bid books may contain in-
complete information, due to simple accident.  Yet, for this study,
the books are studied as an end in themselves, not as some purely
objective representation of reality.  Second, the statements made by
the bidding cities are considered to be binding by the IOC.59
Whether or not false statements in the bid books can be sanctioned
by the IOC is up for debate.60  Regardless, even if the bidders lie,
the bids are illustrative of what they think is important, and if the
IOC can rely on the claims made in the bid books, so can this study.
The concern about the reliability of the study is a standard con-
cern with qualitative studies and that the study may not be repro-
ducible.  Yet, this study uses documents that are publicly available.
Therefore, other researchers can reproduce the methodology
above and verify the results.  There may be different interpretations
of the data and results, but such interpretations will only lead to a
richer discussion.
V. ANALYSIS OF BIDS MADE TO HOST THE OLYMPIC GAMES
The analysis of the bids submitted to host the Olympic Games
covers ten legal themes: (1) “general” legal issues, (2) intellectual
property rights/ambush marketing, (3) customs and immigration,
(4) anti-doping, (5) media, (6) safety and security, (7) taxation, (8)
environment, (9) technology, and (10) government support.
These categories are nearly identical to those used by the IOC, with
59. This consideration is less applicable for the Applicant City bid books, but
certainly applies to the Candidate City documentation.  The IOC, in its Candida-
ture Procedure, requires a standard text guarantee from bidders that should (as
opposed to shall) include the following statement whereby the Candidate City:
“Understand(s) and agree(s) that all representations, warranties and covenants
contained in the Candidate City’s bid documents, as well as all other commitments
made, either in writing or orally, by either the Candidate City (including the Bid
Committee) or its NOC to the IOC, shall be binding on the city.” 2020 CANDIDA-
TURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 224.  This statement also applies to commitments
made during site visits. Id. at 30.
60. For instance, Franck Latty is concerned that the sporting institutions are
not granted full legal security, and a less-than-scrupulous host could take advan-
tage of their sovereign position and override particular event-related guarantees
such as freedom for athletes to enter the territory.  To secure the sporting bodies’
position, Latty suggests arbitration clauses, or the reliance on bilateral investment
treaties as a mechanism to ensure compliance. See Franck Latty, Transnational
Sports Law, INT’L SPORTS L.J., no. 1-2, 2011, at 34, 36–37.
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some exceptions.  First, the category of “intellectual property/am-
bush marketing” is comprised of questions from the IOC categories
of “legal aspects” (i.e., general/miscellaneous) and “marketing.”
This rearrangement is made because intellectual property issues are
important to the IOC and thematically fit together with each other.
Second, as of the 2020 Games, “customs and immigration” has
merged with “legal aspects.”61  However, given the size and com-
plexity of the “customs and immigration” category, and recognizing
that it has been a separate category for four of the five Games that
are examined, it is kept separate here.  Third, a question on taxa-
tion of media members has been moved from the “media” category
to the “taxation” category, as it deals more with taxation than me-
dia.  Finally, a question on lotteries has been moved to the “gen-
eral” section from its place in the questionnaire under “marketing”
as it is a minor question not necessitating its own section.
Beyond the questions asked by the IOC in the questionnaires,
there is also a recent development: the inclusion of “pre-requisite
criteria” established by the IOC in 2011 for the 2020 Olympic
Games host selection process.62  These pre-requisite criteria man-
date that: the dates of the Summer Olympic Games must be in the
window of July 15 and August 31 (absent an exception from the
IOC); the National Olympic Committee (“NOC”) must be compli-
ant with the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (“WADA”) rules; and, dis-
putes over the host selection process are subject to the jurisdiction
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), to the exclusion of
national courts.63  The latter two criteria have legal relevance, and
are discussed here, in the sections on anti-doping, and general legal
issues, respectively.  They fit comfortably within those categories,
despite being physically located in annexes to the questionnaire.64
The structure for each section will be as follows: (1) introduc-
ing each section, providing background information where needed;
(2) quoting the question that the IOC has asked, which requests or
requires bidders to change their laws, and addressing changes to
the question over time; (3) discussing the responses of the bidders
to the question, repeating steps 2 and 3 per IOC question; and, (4)
discussing any other notable responses from the other questions
that address legal issues.
61. See 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 93–95.
62. See 2020 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 44, at 5.
63. Id.
64. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, Annex I, availa-
ble at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/2020_Annex1.pdf.
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A. General Legal Issues
The questions within the category of “General Legal Issues” do
not belong to a particular theme, and are generally found under
the IOC category of “legal aspects” in the IOC Candidature Accept-
ance and Candidature Procedures.65
The key question within the “legal aspects” section straightfor-
wardly asks Applicant Cities: “Do you envisage the implementation
of any new laws to facilitate the organisation of the Olympic Games?
Explain.”66  Responses of the bidders to this question are mixed.
Seventeen bidders said they would change their laws, while four-
teen said they would not.  One bidder, Sofia, did not answer the
question.
Yet, looking at the responses in detail, nuance emerges.  Of the
bidders who said they anticipated new laws, ten did not provide any
details.  Seven bidders responded with specifics as to which laws
they would address.  The common type of law to be addressed was
anti-ambush marketing laws (Moscow, New York City, and Chi-
cago).67  London stated it would implement a new law allowing the
national lottery to raise funds for the Olympic Games.68  Jaca’s bid
focused on anti-doping efforts.69  New York City offered to modify
state legislation regarding firearms competitions, authorization of
medical treatment of athletes by their team physicians, and restric-
tions on street vendors.70  Baku, for both its 2016 and 2020 bids,
laid out a long list of laws that it would change.71
The bidders that did not anticipate changes to their laws also
varied in the details of their responses.  Of these fourteen bidders,
six simply stated they did not anticipate a need to change any laws.
Five bidders said they did not anticipate changing their laws, but
that they would do so if required.  In a strange set of responses,
three bidders stated that they did not anticipate the implementa-
tion of any new laws, but then went on to describe the new laws they
planned on implementing.  Almaty indicated that they would im-
plement new intellectual property and ambush marketing laws,72
while Rome stated that it would review and revise its anti-ambush
65. See id. at 93; 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 76.
66. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 93.
67. Moscow 2012, Applicant City, at 13; New York City 2012, Applicant City, n.
pag; Chicago 2012, Applicant City, at 13.
68. London 2012, Applicant City, at 12.
69. Jaca 2014, Applicant City, at 17.
70. New York City 2012, Applicant City, n. pag.
71. Baku 2016, Applicant City, at 15; Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 73.
72. Almaty 2014, Applicant City, at 19.
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marketing laws.73  Istanbul’s 2020 bid stated that Turkey would un-
dertake a comprehensive review of its Olympic Law, and revise it if
necessary.74
From these responses, it appears that not all bidders are auto-
matically on board with the idea that they would have to change
their legislation in the effort to host the Olympic Games.  However,
it does raise the question as to whether the bidders that say they
foresaw no changes in law remain consistent throughout the rest of
the bidding process, and actually propose no changes to their laws
in other questions.
Six other “general” legal questions were asked of the bidders.
First, in response to the question asking if there are any obstacles to
the organization of the Olympic Games in their country,75 the bid-
ders unanimously state that there are none.  Such a response is un-
surprising as announcing any legal obstacles may be tantamount to
admitting that there will be problems with hosting the Games.
A second question asks Applicant Cities whether a referendum
would be required to host the Olympic Games, and if opponents
could force such a referendum.76  The part of the question about
“forcing a referendum” has been asked since the 2020 bidding pro-
cess.  It should be noted that not only was one Olympic Games
moved due to a referendum,77 several bids for the 2022 Winter
Olympic Games were cancelled due to negative referendum out-
comes.78  Bidders generally responded that a referendum would
not be held in their country.  Only Sofia’s bid mentioned that refer-
endums at a local level were a possibility.79  The other exceptional
73. Rome 2020, Applicant City, at 101.
74. Istanbul 2020, Applicant City, at 73.
75. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 93.
76. Id. at 98.
77. The 1976 Winter Olympic Games were moved from Denver, U.S.A. to
Innsbruck, Austria.  The state of Colorado voted on a referendum in 1972, enact-
ing a state constitutional amendment, prohibiting the state from “levying taxes and
appropriating or loaning funds for the purpose of aiding or furthering the 1976
Winter Olympic Games. The ballot initiative was passed with a vote count of
514,228–350,964, or 59.4% to 40.6%. Ballot History, Initiative, An Act to Amend
Articles X and XI of the State Constitution to prohibit the State from levying taxes
and appropriating or loaning funds for the purpose of aiding or furthering the
1976 Winter Olympic Games, 1972 Colorado Ballot No. 8 (Colo. 1972), available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/lcs/ballothistory.nsf/835d2ada8de735e787256ffe0074
333d/185275e7a6d5715787256ffd006a4944?OpenDocument; see also Colo. Const.
art. XI, § 10 (repealed 1991).
78. See Christopher Clarey, Bidders are Melting Away, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2014,
at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/sports/olympics/bid-
ders-for-2022-winter-games-are-melting-away.html?_r=0.
79. Sofia 2014, Applicant City, at 13.
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bid was from Prague.  Although there was no requirement for a ref-
erendum in the Czech Republic for Prague’s bid,80 the IOC Candi-
dature Acceptance Working Group noted a petition brought
forward by “Municipalities Against Tax Discrimination” requesting
a referendum.81  That there was no requirement in the Czech Re-
public, but a possibility for opponents to the Games to force a refer-
endum, may have led to the later inclusion of the language on
“forcing a referendum.”
A similar question was asked of the Candidate Cities for the
2018 Games, where the IOC not only asked about legislation al-
lowing for a referendum, but also the legal implications for a refer-
endum that was negative to the hosting of the Olympic Games.82
All three bidders had stated in the Applicant City stage that referen-
dums were not required by legislation to host the Olympic Games.
Of the three bidders, Annecy and Munich stated that although na-
tional referendums were not a possibility, that local referendums
were.83  Given the local nature of the Games, it would seem that
local referendums are likely more important than national referen-
dums.  PyeongChang only addressed national referendums,84 al-
though the IOC Evaluation Commission noted that local
referendums were also possible for PyeongChang’s bid.85  Only Mu-
nich seemed to grapple with the legal consequences of a referen-
dum, by stating that a “simple poll” asking a question such as “Are
you in favour of Bavaria withdrawing its support for the Munich
2018 Bid” would be impermissible, but regulations enacted under
state law could be subject to a referendum.86  Thus, it is conceiva-
ble, without examining Bavarian referendum laws, that a referen-
dum such as the one that held up the Denver Winter Olympic
Games could pass muster in Munich.  In fact, the IOC’s Evaluation
80. Prague 2016, Applicant City, at 15.
81. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., GAMES OF THE XXXI OLYMPIAD 2016 WORKING
GROUP REPORT 18 (2008) [hereinafter 2016 WORKING GROUP REPORT], available at
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_1317.pdf.
82. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2018 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE AND QUESTION-
NAIRE: XXIII OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 78 (2010) [hereinafter 2018 CANDIDATURE
PROCEDURE], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elec
tions/2018_CPQ-ENGLISH-FULL.pdf.
83. Annecy 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 55; Munich 2018, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 59.
84. PyeongChang 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 61.
85. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., REPORT OF THE IOC 2018 EVALUATION COMMISSION:
XXIII OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 103 (2011) [hereinafter 2018 EVALUATION COMMIS-
SION REPORT], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_
PDFfiles/Evaluation_Commission/FINAL_DRAFT_2018_EV_COM-ENG.pdf.
86. Munich 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 59.
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Commission noted that in Munich, a group sought “a referendum
to challenge the legality of the Host City Contract.”87  The bid com-
mittee responded to the IOC that municipal contracts cannot be
reversed.
Third, the IOC asks bidders if they have any laws relating to
sport.88  The bidders offer a diverse set of responses, outlining na-
tional and local laws, with some enshrining the right to participate
in sport in their Constitutions.  The subject matter of the laws
ranges from mere “support/promotion” to the provision of fund-
ing, consumer protection, intellectual property rights protection,
and anti-doping laws.
Fourth, Candidate Cities were asked to describe any legislation
they had in relation to lotteries.89  All but three of the Candidate
Cities said they would provide for lotteries.  The two American bids
and Munich said they would not allow lotteries.90  The two French
bids allowed lotteries and also mentioned that they would take steps
to prevent betting on Olympic events.91
Fifth, the IOC asked Candidate Cities whether there were any,
national or international obligations binding your country
(e.g. national law, international treaties or European
Union rules and requirements) that could lead to a con-
flict with the obligations of the City, the NOC and the
OCOG pursuant to the Host City Contract and the
Olympic Charter, including obligations of a commercial,
financial, fiscal or legal nature.92
Prior to the 2016 Games, the question emphasized competi-
tion law as an issue to be addressed.93  Candidate Cities were almost
uniform in their responses that there would be no impacts.  Only
Salzburg hinted at a possible impact, hinting that European Union
rules on procurement could cause delay, except that the minimal
amount of infrastructure required for the Games would minimize
87. 2018 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 85, at 34.
88. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 93.
89. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 119.
90. New York City 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 135; Chicago 2016, Candi-
date City, Vol. 1, at 141; Munich 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 139.
91. Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 149; Annecy 2018, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 147.
92. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 78.
93. See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2014 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE AND QUESTION-
NAIRE: XXII OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES IN 2014 75 (2006) [hereinafter 2014 CANDIDA-
TURE PROCEDURE], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/
en_report_1078.pdf.
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this delay.94  The response from the PeyongChang 2018 focused on
competition law, perhaps a holdover from PeyongChang’s 2014 bid
response when competition law concerns were to be emphasized,
but PeyongChang also states that:
Due to this [protection of free and fair competition], the
aforementioned parties [non-OCOG-businesses and the
Republic of Korea] are not commercially, financially or le-
gally bound by obligations concerning the Host City, the
NOC or POCOG under the Host City Contract or the
Olympic Charter; rather, they are subject to internation-
ally established universal criteria concerning the hosting
of the Winter Games.  The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games
and the 2002 FIFA World Cup™ Korea/ Japan were
hosted under the same principles.95
This puzzling response gives no explanation of “internationally
established universal criteria,” nor is any reference to this concept
made anywhere else in the bid.
Also, until the 2016 Games, the question asked about the im-
pact that such agreements “would have upon the organisation and
staging” of the Games,96 but then changed the question in 2016 to
focus on the conflict that such agreements would have with “the
obligations of the City, the NOC and the OCOG pursuant to the
Host City Contract and the Olympic Charter.”97  Wording changes
such as this may signal a movement from a concern with the practi-
cal aspects of hosting the Games, to a more legalistic format of com-
pliance with the Host City Contract and the Olympic Charter.
Finally, as one of the new “pre-requisite criteria” for the 2020
Games, the IOC required Applicant Cities to sign a declaration
granting jurisdiction over any disputes “arising from the period of
the application of the city in connection with the 2020 Candidature
Acceptance Procedure or its interpretation” to the CAS.98  Swiss law
is the law governing the dispute.99  The IOC found that the 2020
94. See Salzburg 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 48, 50.
95. PyeongChang 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 61.
96. 2014 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 93, at 75.
97. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2016 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE AND QUESTION-
NAIRE: GAMES OF THE XXXI OLYMPIAD 76 (2008) [hereinafter 2016 CANDIDATURE
PROCEDURE], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/
en_report_1318.pdf.
98. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at Annex I: CAS
Declaration, available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elec
tions/2020_Annex1.pdf.
99. Id.
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Applicant Cities that submitted bids (i.e., Rome was not evaluated
as it did not submit a bid at the end) met the criteria.  Similarly,
Candidate Cities from 2012–20 have been required to sign an “un-
dertaking,” that requires them, inter alia, to sign the host city con-
tract without reservation, and to follow the rules regarding the
Olympic Marks.  The “undertaking” refers all disputes to the CAS,
but it seems that this clause is limited to disputes “in connection
with this Undertaking.”100
B. Intellectual Property/Ambush Marketing
Intellectual property and anti-ambush marketing protection
are vital to the IOC and to the Organizing Committees of the
Olympic Games (“OCOGs”).  The eleven sponsors who belong to
The Olympic Partners (“TOP”) Program paid $957 million (USD)
to the IOC for the right to sponsor the Olympic Games from
2008–2012.101  The IOC is thus highly motivated to protect its
trademark and brand, and through that the investment, trade-
marks, and brands of its sponsors.
Trademark protection for Olympic marks has been attempted
to be made on a global scale through the Nairobi Treaty on the Protec-
tion of the Olympic Symbol.102  However, relatively few parties have
signed onto the Treaty since its adoption in 1981.  As of July 15,
2015, there are only fifty-two state parties.103  Of these parties, only
six of the nineteen countries that make up the G20 (not counting
the European Union) have the Treaty in force in their states.  Of
the thirty-two bids for the Olympic Games considered in this article,
only nine bidders (28%), representing six of the seventeen coun-
tries that bid on the Games, had the Treaty in force at the time of
their bids.104  Kazakhstan has recently acceded to the Nairobi Treaty,
while Azerbaijan acceded after its 2016 bid, likely in anticipation of
its 2020 bid.
100. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 59.
101. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE 11 (2012 ed.)
[hereinafter OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE], available at http://www.olympic.org/
Documents/IOC_Marketing/OLYMPIC-MARKETING-FACT-FILE-2012.pdf.
102. Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol, Sept. 26, 1981,
World Intellectual Prop. Org., available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/trea-
ties/text.jsp?file_id=287413.
103. Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol, Sept. 26, 1981,
Contracting Parties, World Intellectual Prop. Org., available at http://www
.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=22 (last visited Feb. 8,
2016).
104. These bidders are: Baku 2020, Doha (x2), Havana, Moscow, Rio de
Janeiro (x2), Rome, and Sochi.
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Unlike trademark protection, ambush marketing is a concept
that is not clearly-defined.105  Trademark protection is often de-
fined in one of two ways.  First, ambush marketing may be defined
as an organization creating an association between itself and an
event, but without obtaining permission from the event rights-
holder.106  The organization is attempting to obtain goodwill from
the event.107  Second, ambush marketing may be defined as an or-
ganization purposefully undermining a competitor’s sponsorship
benefits.108  The focus here is on the deceit and confusion of con-
sumers.109  A more extreme version would be when a company
falsely portrays itself as an event sponsor.110  To add to the debate
over ambush marketing, there are questions about whether ambush
marketing is an insidious practice that needs to be curtailed,111 or
whether it is simply ingenious marketing.112  Laws such as trade-
mark infringement, or torts such as “passing off,” false advertising,
or “dilution” may be applicable,113 but most ambush marketers are
savvy enough to avoid running afoul of these causes of action.114  As
an entity that is the target of ambush marketing, regardless of the
definition, the International Olympic Committee has demanded
that hosts enact anti-ambush marketing legislation.
The IOC asks Candidate City-stage bidders questions that
could lead to changes in public law in intellectual property law and
anti-ambush marketing measures.  Candidate cities are required by
the IOC to:
105. Dana Ellis, Teresa Scassa & Benoit Se´guin, Framing Ambush Marketing as a
Legal Issue: An Olympic Perspective, 14 SPORT MGMT. REV. 297, 298 (2011).
106. Edward Vassallo, Kristin Blemaster & Patricia Werner, An International
Look at Ambush Marketing, 95 T.M.R. 1338, at 1339 (2005), cited in Scassa, supra note
17, at 47.
107. James & Osborn, supra note 4, at 422.
108. Steve McKelvey, Sans Legal Restraint, No Stopping Brash, Creative Ambush
Marketers, BRANDWEEK, Apr. 18, 1994, at 20, cited in Juda Strawczynski, Is Canada
Ready for the Vancouver Winter Games? An Examination of Canada’s Olympic Intellectual
Property Protection, 62 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 213, 214 (2004).
109. See Bacalao-Fleury, supra note 17, at 197; see also Strawczynski, supra note
108, at 214.
110. See Jennifer L. Donatuti, Note, Can China Protect the Olympics, or Should the
Olympics be Protected from China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 209 (2007).
111. Sudipta Bhattacharjee & Ganesh Rao, Tackling Ambush Marketing: The
Need for Regulation and Analysing the Present Legislative and Contractual Efforts, 9 SPORT
IN SOC’Y 128, 130 (2006).
112. Vassallo et al., supra note 106, at 101.
113. Id. at 89–92; Jane Sebel & Dominic Gyngell, Protecting Olympic Gold: Am-
bush Marketing and Other Threats to Olympic Symbols and Indicia, 22 UNSW L.J. 691,
695–99 (1999).
114. Ellis et al., supra note 105, at 300, 305.
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[E]nsure that the Olympic symbol, the terms
“Olympic” and “Olympiad” and the Olympic motto are
protected in the name of the IOC and/or that they have
obtained, or shall obtain from their government and/or
their competent national authorities, adequate and con-
tinuing legal protection to the satisfaction of the IOC and
in the name of the IOC.
Describe the legal measures in force in your country
to protect the Olympic symbol, emblems, logos, marks and
other Olympic-related marks and designations.
What commitments do you already have in place from
the government of your country to such effect?
Provide a declaration from the government of your
country stipulating that all necessary legal measures have
been taken, or will be taken, to protect the above-men-
tioned Olympic-related marks and designations in the
name of the IOC.
An equivalent level of protection must be guaranteed
for the Paralympic marks and the term “Paralympic” to
the satisfaction of the IPC and IOC.115
Generally speaking, all of the bidders provided that they had
taken the necessary legal measures to protect the Olympic and
Paralympic marks.  All eighteen Candidate Cities explicitly assured
the IOC that they had protected the Olympic symbol.  The only
exceptional case was the IOC’s concern over Moscow’s statement
that it would “take appropriate measures” to protect the marks, and
the bid’s providing of the registration of the marks not in English
(presumably in Russian).116  Twelve explicitly assured the IOC that
they had protected the worlds “Olympic” and “Olympiad,” amongst
others, with an additional bidder protecting “word marks.”  Eight
bidders explicitly stated that they protected the Olympic motto “ci-
tius, altius, fortius,” while the four bidders from France and Russia
provided protection to the Olympic anthem.  Tokyo’s bids explicitly
mentioned “mascots” as something to be protected under trade-
mark.117  The language on the “Paralympics” was added for the
2020 Games, and the three 2020 Candidate Cities stated they al-
ready protected the Paralympic marks.
115. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 77.
116. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., REPORT OF THE IOC EVALUATION COMMISSION FOR
THE GAMES OF THE XXX OLYMPIAD IN 2012 48 (2005).
117. Tokyo 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 68; Tokyo 2020, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 38.
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Only one bidder proposed new laws to enhance trademark
protection.  Sochi proposed new laws to give authorities “the ability
to confiscate property and liquidate firms that commit gross viola-
tions of intellectual property rights.”118  That only one bidder pro-
posed a new law at all is striking since the IOC expressly requires
that “all necessary legal measures have been taken, or will be
taken.”119  If new measures will not be taken, the bidders must be
confident that their trademark protections are sufficient for the
IOC.  Such confidence does not always prevent new legislation,
however.  Canada and the United Kingdom both passed new trade-
mark protection laws for the Olympic symbols prior to their Games
despite already having such laws in place.120  While some countries
may indeed have stronger trademark protection in place than Ca-
nada or the U.K., one could expect more bidders to propose a will-
ingness to at least consider new laws.
Finally, only one bidder, Rio de Janeiro, mentioned the Nairobi
Treaty.121  The Russian bids, Moscow and Sochi, did not mention
the Nairobi Treaty, despite its being ratified by Russia at the time of
bidding.
The IOC appears to realize that ambush marketing and trade-
mark protection, while related, are indeed separate issues.  In spite
of the concerns with defining and preventing ambush marketing,
discussed above, the IOC requires Candidate Cities to:
Provide (a) written guarantee(s) from the relevant govern-
ment authorities confirming that the legislation necessary
to effectively reduce and sanction ambush marketing (e.g.
preventing competitors of Olympic sponsors from engag-
ing in unfair competition), and, during the period begin-
ning two weeks before the Opening Ceremony to the
Closing Ceremony of the Olympic Winter Games elimi-
nate street vending, prevent un-authorized ticket resale,
control advertising space (e.g. billboards, advertising on
public transport, etc.) as well as air space (to ensure no
publicity is allowed in such airspace) will be passed as soon
as possible but no later than 1 January [of two calendar
years before the Games are to be held].122
118. Sochi 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 51.
119. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 77 (emphasis added).
120. See Scassa, supra note 17, at 38–39; James & Osborn, supra note 4, at 411.
121. Rio 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 69.
122. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 115.
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The responses from the Candidate Cities focused on the provi-
sion of guarantees, with few bidders outlining legislative initiatives,
and detailing anti-ambush marketing campaigns.  First and fore-
most, the bidders provided the guarantees required by the IOC.  All
bidders had complied and provided the guarantees, with one ex-
ception.  Annecy’s bid relied on the Geneva, Switzerland airport as
the primary airport to serve the Games, and for the city of Geneva
to provide 13% of the hotel rooms.123  However, Annecy’s bid did
not provide an anti-ambush marketing guarantee from the Swiss au-
thorities, which was seen as a potential “risk” by the IOC Evaluation
Commission.124
Although bidders provided the required guarantees, few bid-
ders provided any details as to what steps they would take.  Given
the difficulty of implementing effective anti-ambush marketing leg-
islation, discussed above, the lack of detail included in the bids may
be expected.  Five of the eighteen Candidate City bids have stated
that they would proactively pass new legislation: London, Madrid
2012, Madrid 2020, and the two PyeongChang bids.125  Salzburg,
Rio de Janeiro, and Istanbul pledged to at least consider, if not en-
act, new legislation if it was considered necessary.126  However, the
closest any of these eight bids came to providing any sort of detail
on what such legislation would entail was Rio’s pledge to “focus on
the speed of decision [sic] and response to support anti-ambush
measures.”127  The absence of proactive implementation of anti-am-
bush marketing legislation speaks to either a great confidence that
the bidders have in their present legislation, or a lack of realization
of what such laws entail.  Even Rome’s bid, in the Applicant City
stage, pointed out that although Italy had held the Games in To-
rino in 2006, studies were being undertaken to strengthen anti-am-
bush marketing laws.128
Although only eight Candidate Cities (representing six unique
cities) explicitly considered at least the possibility of passing new
legislation, nine bidders representing six cities outlined broader
anti-ambush marketing campaigns.  These campaigns generally in-
123. 2018 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 85, at 43.
124. Id. at 70.
125. London 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 47; Madrid 2012, Candidate
City, Vol. 1, at 121; Madrid 2020, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 85; PyeongChang 2014,
Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 121; PyeongChang 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 131.
126. Salzburg 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 118; Rio de Janeiro 2016, Candi-
date City, Vol. 1, at 139; Istanbul 2020, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 105.
127. Rio de Janeiro 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 86.
128. Rome 2020, Applicant City, at 101.
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clude three key elements: education of local businesses and other
relevant groups, call centers to report instances of ambush market-
ing, and a single responsible body for monitoring and/or enforce-
ment.  Seven bidders outline educational measures, four pledge to
establish contact centers, and four offer to establish a single depart-
ment or dedicated team to deal with ambush marketing concerns.
PeyongChang’s 2018 bid also included internet monitoring and en-
forcement of ambush marketing attempts.129  While the fact that
more bidders outlined anti-ambush marketing campaigns as op-
posed to outlining legislation is surprising, the inclusion of such
campaigns should not come as a shock.  The academic literature
regularly hints that legislation alone is not enough, and that a more
encompassing anti-ambush marketing campaign is required, and
one-half of bidders seem to follow the same track.130
The provision for ticket resale was added only for the 2020
Games, and the 2020 bidders provided either little information on
anti-ticket touting legislation, or in the case of Madrid, no informa-
tion on ticket-touting legislation.
C. Customs and Immigration
Over 10,500 athletes attended the London 2012 Olympic Sum-
mer Games.131  These athletes represented 204 National Olympic
Committees, while four athletes, three from the Netherlands Antil-
les, and one from South Sudan, participated under the Olympic
Flag.132  These athletes need to bring in items for their competi-
tions such as guns, bows and arrows, horses, medical equipment,
and other items that would often be barred entry to a country, or at
least be subject to severe import duties and other restrictions.  In
addition to the athletes who need to enter the host country, sup-
port staff, media, and spectators also need and want to attend the
Olympic Games, leading to hundreds of thousands more people
who are entering and exiting the host country in a period of less
129. PyeongChang 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 131.
130. See Ellis et al., supra note 105, at 299; Vassallo et al., supra note 106, at
100.
131. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., LONDON 2012 FACTS & FIGURES 1 (2012), available
at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_documents_Factsheets/Lon
don_2012_Facts_and_Figures-eng.pdf.
132. Id.  Athletes compete for their National Olympic Committees, not for
their countries. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 40–41.  Since neither the
Netherlands Antilles nor South Sudan had established a National Olympic Com-
mittee prior to the 2012 Games, the IOC took the decision to allow them to com-
pete under the Olympic Flag.
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than a month.133  Then, a month later, the influx of visitors takes
place again with the Paralympic Games.  To process these visitors,
the IOC requires a bidder to state its plans to reduce the burdens
erected by immigration and customs formalities on entry to a coun-
try for the time period around the Games.
The International Olympic Committee requires assurance that
its global constituency, namely IOC members, representatives from
the international sporting federations (International Federations,
or “IFs”) and athletes, are able to enter the country hosting the
Olympic Games.  Yet, IOC requirements do not necessarily mean
that all who are associated with the Olympic Games are admitted.
For instance, Mowaffak Joumaa, the head of the Syrian Olympic
Committee, and a general in its military, was refused entry to the
United Kingdom for the 2012 Olympic Games, due to his ties with
the Syrian government and its violent suppression of opposition.134
Provide a guarantee from the relevant authorities that,
notwithstanding any regulations in your country to the
contrary that would otherwise be applicable, accredited
persons in possession of a valid passport and an Olympic
identity and accreditation card will be able to enter into
the country and carry out their Olympic function for the
duration of the Olympic Games and for a period not ex-
ceeding one month before and one month after the
Olympic Games, in accordance with the Accreditation and
Entries at the Olympic Games – Users’ Guide.135
This guarantee was required of Candidate Cities from 2012–18,
and of Applicant Cities in 2020.  All twenty-one cities involved pro-
vided the guarantees.  Related to this question, is the requirement
of a guarantee by the Applicant Cities from 2012–20 to guarantee
“free access to and free movement around the host country for all
133. The United Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics London estimated
that 420,000 visitors came to the U.K. specifically to attend the Olympic Games.
UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, OVERSEAS TRAVEL AND TOUR-
ISM, AUGUST 2012 7 (2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_
282767.pdf.  However, overall visitors to the U.K. were 5% lower than in years past.
Id. at 1.  The Olympics tends not to cause a boost in short-term tourism as poten-
tial tourists stay away to avoid the perceived crowds, expenses, and other negative
attributes of visiting during the Olympics. See Shoval, supra note 20, at 595.
134. See Helen William, Syria Olympics Chief General Mowaffak Joumaa ‘Refused
Visa’, THE INDEPENDENT (London) (June 22, 2012), http://www.independent.co
.uk/news/uk/home-news/syria-olympics-chief-general-mowaffak-joumaa-refused-
visa-7876261.html.
135. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 94.
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accredited persons.”136  This question was asked in the “Govern-
ment Support” section, and all bidders provided the guarantee, al-
though Sofia’s guarantee was deemed by the IOC’s Working Group
to require amendment to “include precisely and without qualifica-
tion the wording required by the IOC” in regards to free access and
movement.137
During the years examined in this article, the European states
that participate in the joint customs and border union known as the
“Schengen Area,” enacted the Specific Procedures and Conditions
Facilitating the Issuing of Visas to Members of the Olympic Family
Participating in the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games.138
States that are parties to the Schengen Agreement have agreed to
implement common criteria for entry into the Schengen Area, thus
losing some control over their own borders.139  In the first years of
the Schengen Agreement, ad-hoc regulations were enacted for the
Athens and Turin Games.140  Since those Games, bidders have re-
lied on their precedent.141  For the 2020 Games, Madrid’s 2020 bid
could point to the new procedures, which would facilitate entry
into Spain.142
While the athletes, IOC and IF personnel, and spectators are
the heart of the Olympic Games, those who work in the years lead-
ing up to the games in preparation of the venues are just as vital.
The IOC informs bidding cities that, “certain Games-related per-
sonnel [e.g., monitors of test events, or anti-doping personnel] will
require temporary entry into the host country to perform their
136. Id. at 97.
137. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., XXII WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES IN 2014: REPORT BY
THE IOC CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE WORKING GROUP TO THE IOC EXECUTIVE
BOARD 22 (2006) [hereinafter 2014 WORKING GROUP REPORT], available at http://
www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_1073.pdf.
138. Commission Regulation 810/2009 of July 13, 2009, Establishing a Com-
munity Code on Visas, Annex XI, 2009 O.J. (L 243) 49 (EC), available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:243:0001:0058:en
:PDF.
139. However, internal border controls may be re-established for a limited
period by a member of Schengen for reasons of “public policy or national secur-
ity.”  Council of the European Union, The Schengen Aquis as referred to in Article
1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999, Title II, Ch. 1, Art. 2(2),
2000 O.J. (L 239) 20 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2000_239_R_0001_01&from=EN.
140. See Regulation 2046/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
sel, 2005 O.J. (L 334) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005R2046&from=EN; Council Regulation 1295/
2003,, 2003 O.J. (L 183) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R1295&from=EN.
141. See, e.g., Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 79.
142. Madrid 2020, Applicant City, at 72.
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Olympic duties prior to the Olympic Games.  Such persons may be
required to domicile in the country for at least one year before the
Olympic Games.”143  The cities are asked to “[d]escribe the process
and average length of time required to apply for and issue work
permits for temporary entry of personnel to work and domicile in
the country and how this will be adjusted, if necessary, in order to
conform with the requirements referred to above.”144
Similar to the previous question, this question was asked of
Candidate Cities from 2012–18, and then asked of the Applicant
Cities for 2020.  Additionally, the portion “how this will be adjusted,
if necessary,” was not asked in 2012.
Only one bidder, Baku, proposed legislation.  Baku stated that
it would legislate a fast-track process in the proposed omnibus
Olympic Law it would pass if awarded the Games.145  Otherwise, the
other changes suggested by bidders were of a regulatory or adminis-
trative variety, as opposed to a legislative proposal.  Tokyo’s bids
would have suspended the need to obtain a Certificate of Eligibility
prior to arrival in Japan.146  Munich’s bid pledged that Germany
would do away with a working visa requirement for those who were
working for less than three months in the country.147  Rio de
Janeiro includes TOP sponsors as a group to be included in any
expedited work visa procedures.148  As to the rest, bidders de-
scribed how they would grant the applications for work permits
“priority” status, would “expedite” the work permits, or would en-
sure that a “dedicated team” would handle the permits.
Closely related to the previous question, the IOC asks bidders
to:
Provide a guarantee stating that the temporary entry of
certain personnel into your country for the organisation
of the Olympic Games will be authorised and that such
persons will obtain appropriate work permits in an expe-
dited and simplified manner, without any duties or taxes
being payable.149
143. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 95.
144. Id.
145. Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 73, 79.
146. Tokyo 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 78; Tokyo 2020, Applicant City, at
74.
147. Munich 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 71.
148. Rio 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 79.
149. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 79.
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All of the Candidate Cities granted the guarantees required of
them by the IOC.  Rio made the point that none of those admitted
under the scheme would be constrained by local labor laws.150  An-
necy stated that Switzerland would recognize the French permits
granted under this scheme.151  Similar to the previous question,
Madrid 2020 explicitly included the TOP sponsors.152
In addition to the guarantees regarding the entry of persons,
the IOC strives to ensure that items that are considered essential to
the Olympic Games are able to be brought into the host country
without burdens such as bans on importation or customs duties.
These essentials include things such as sporting and medical equip-
ment.  The IOC thus asks Candidate Cities to:
Provide a guarantee from the relevant authorities, con-
cerning the import, use and export of goods, including
consumables, required by the IOC, IFs, NOCs and their
delegations, broadcasters, written and photographic press,
sponsors and suppliers, free of all customs duties, in order
for them to carry out their obligations regarding the cele-
bration of the Olympic Games.153
The question had some minor changes, which were the addi-
tion of “consumables” in 2014, and the refining of the term “me-
dia” to “broadcasters, written and photographic press” in 2020.  All
bidders signed the guarantee required.  The bids from France and
South Korea made explicit a condition that the items imported not
be sold or donated, but consumed or re-exported.154  Five other
bidders from four countries made re-export a condition of not im-
posing customs duties.155
Several other questions are asked by the IOC, but simply ask
hosts to describe regulations that are in existence, or will be in
place for test events prior to the Games, and are not addressed in
detail here, but listed in the Appendix to this article.
150. Rio 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 79.
151. Annecy 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 73.
152. Madrid 2020, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 51.
153. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 79.
154. Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at, 83; PyeongChang 2014, Candidate
City, Vol. 1, at, 63, 77; Annecy 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at, 77.
155. London 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 63; Sochi 2014, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 61; Tokyo 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 78; Madrid 2020, Candidate
City, Vol. 1, at 51; Tokyo 2020, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 44.
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D. Anti-Doping
Doping in modern sport has been a concern of the interna-
tional bodies for over half a century.156  Despite its history, doping
truly became an Olympic concern only at the 1960 Olympic Games,
when Danish cyclist Kund Enemark Jensen died, and an autopsy
showed the presence of an amphetamine.157  Jensen’s official au-
topsy showed that he died from heatstroke (having rode in the
team time trial in temperatures around 38–40 degrees Celsius),
while a fall off his bike, subsequent skull fracture, and treatment in
an overheated tent probably did more damage than any ampheta-
mine.158  Regardless of the cause of death, the incident spurred the
IOC to form a Medical Commission, who then formed a sub-com-
mission on doping, leading to a list of prohibited substances, and
the beginning of drug testing at the 1968 Olympic Games.159  Since
then, the anti-doping fight has escalated in earnest with the estab-
lishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999.160
The WADA’s goal is to establish a harmonized, global legal anti-
doping regime, and the IOC’s requirements reflect this mission.161
The IOC requires bidders to sign onto and implement the rele-
vant provisions of the key international anti-doping instruments.
The IOC is also concerned about cooperation between anti-doping
authorities and local/state authorities.
The IOC’s primary concern is that host states:
Provide a guarantee from the relevant national authority
confirming that
a. the (WADA) World Anti-Doping Code and the
IOC Anti-Doping Rules (which are based on the World
Anti-Doping Code) which are in force in 2020 will apply
upon the occasion of the Olympic Games; and
b. should there be any conflict between, on the one
hand, the World Anti-Doping Code and the IOC Anti-
156. Richard W. Pound & Kerwin Clarke, Doping in Sport, in HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 133, 133 (James A.R. Nafziger & Stephen F. Ross eds.,
2011).
157. See Verner Møller, Knud Enemark Jensen’s Death During the 1960 Rome Olym-
pics: A Search for Truth?, 25 SPORT IN HISTORY 452, 470 (2005).
158. Id. at 462, 465 (using the term “sunstroke” instead of “heatstroke”).
159. Pound & Clarke, supra note 156, at 133–34.
160. Id. at 135.
161. See, e.g., John T. Wendt, Toward Harmonization: British Olympic Ass’n v.
World Anti-Doping Agency, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 155, 156 (2012); Lorenzo
Casini, Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency, 6 INT’L ORG.
L. REV. 421, 443–45 (2009).
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Doping Rules and, on the other hand, any other anti-dop-
ing rules applicable in your country, the World Anti-Dop-
ing Code and the IOC Anti-Doping Rules shall take
precedence
c. the relevant authority(ies) of the host country will
provide its (their) full cooperation and support for the im-
plementation of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules at the time of
the Olympic Games, in particular in relation to investiga-
tions and procedures regarding athletes’ support person-
nel or any other person involved in trafficking, or in
assisting in any way in relation to the use of prohibited
substances or prohibited methods, and that relevant laws
are in place in order to ensure the foregoing.162
Parts a) and b) of this guarantee have been required since
2014, and all bidders from 2012–20 delivered on these guarantees.
In the bid books, some were less than explicit on every point, but as
the guarantees themselves are included in a separate file, the details
may have been spelled out there.  Only one bidder ran into
problems: the IOC was concerned about Spanish compliance with
the WADA Code during Madrid’s 2016 bid as Spain had just passed
new anti-doping legislation.163  As of the 2020 bids, Spain treats
doping as a criminal offense.164  Part (c) of the question has only
been asked since the 2018 Games.  This question was perhaps
spurred into existence by Madrid’s response to the 2016 variant of
this question, where the Spanish authorities pledged cooperation
in regards to investigations and procedures.165  This question as a
whole may be concerning, as bidders are essentially required to
promise to enforce a set of unknown future rules, and in the case of
the WADA Code and IOC Anti-Doping Rules, have international
rules take precedence over national laws and regulations.
The theme of cooperation is again addressed by the IOC in a
second question:
What legislation is in place or will be implemented to al-
low cooperation and sharing of information between the
sports authorities and the public authorities (police, cus-
162. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 86.
163. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., REPORT OF THE 2016 IOC EVALUATION COMMIS-
SION, GAMES OF THE XXXI OLYMPIAD 75 (2009) [hereinafter 2016 EVALUATION
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/
EN/en_report_1469.pdf.
164. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 86.
165. Madrid 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 25.
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toms) in relation to the fight against doping and to imple-
ment the commitments of the Host Country under the
UNESCO Convention and the WADA Code?166
This question was asked of Candidate Cities in 2018 and of Appli-
cant Cities in 2020.  Most bidders had already adopted legislation to
facilitate cooperation and sharing of information.  Annecy and
PyeongChang pledged to pass legislation in the future to enable
cooperation, while the other bidders already had such laws in place.
Third, in a show of how important these international instru-
ments are to the IOC, as of the 2020 Games, compliance with the
WADA under the Copenhagen Declaration and the UNESCO Con-
vention are now one of three prerequisites to bid on the Games.
Bidders are required to provide the following statement:
“([N]ame(s) of the duly authorised national authority) hereby
confirm(s) that (name of the country) has signed the Co-
penhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport and rati-
fied the UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport,
Paris 19 October 2005, and that legislation is in place (or
will be in place by 7 September 2013) to implement the
commitments of the UNESCO Convention against Doping
in Sport.”167
On its face, it seems curious that the IOC could require bid-
ders to sign and ratify international agreements as a condition pre-
cedent to bidding to host the Olympic Games.  Requirements such
as this particularly raise concerns about the influence of the IOC in
a state’s affairs.  Yet, most national governments or National
Olympic Committees have already signed these two agreements,
most well before it became a requirement to do so.168
Fourth, prior to the 2020 Games, the IOC only asked bidders if
they had signed agreements with WADA, or had ratified the
UNESCO Convention.169  All bidders stated they had signed the
166. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 86.
167. Id. Annex 1, available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_
elections/2020_Annex1.pdf.
168. There were 193 signatories to the Copenhagen Declaration, and 172 par-
ties to the UNESCO Convention as of November 20, 2012. See Copenhagen Declara-
tion List of Signatories, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/
World-Anti-Doping-Program/Governments/Copenhagen-Declaration-on-Anti-
Doping-in-Sport/List-of-signatories/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012); International Con-
vention Against Doping in Sport, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CUL-
TURAL ORGANIZATION, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&
language=E (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
169. See, e.g., 2018 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 82, at 172.
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WADA Code (or come to some sort of agreement with WADA), and
the UNESCO Convention.  The UNESCO Convention had only
come into existence during the 2014 bidding process, and so the
2014 bidders were in the process of ratifying the Convention.  Only
the Salzburg bid had problems ratifying the UNESCO Convention
during the 2014 process.170  Although signing the UNESCO Con-
vention was not a requirement of the 2016 bidding process, five of
the seven Applicant Cities indicated that their countries had signed
the UNESCO Convention.  The exceptions were Rio de Janeiro,
which did not mention the Convention,171 and Chicago, which
went to great pains to point out that it was optimistic that the U.S.
federal government would ratify the treaty in 2008,172 which did
occur by the time of the Evaluation Commission Report.173
Finally, the IOC asks bidders to divulge what legislation they
have on doping.174  Unsurprisingly, all of the bidders have some
sort of anti-doping rules, whether through legislation or regulation.
Many bidders tout that they have recently updated their laws prior
to bidding to host the Games, and are in full compliance with the
WADA Code.
E. Media
The 2012 Summer Olympic Games lays claim to a potential
global audience of almost five billion people.175  Television broad-
casting rights are particularly lucrative for the IOC, with broadcast-
ing rights for the 2009–12 period generating $3.914 billion (USD)
in revenue, four times the revenue generated by the global spon-
sors that belong to the TOP Program.176  To reach this global audi-
170. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC 2014 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, XXII
OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES IN 2014 40 (2007) [hereinafter 2014 EVALUATION COMMIS-
SION], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_
1187.pdf.
171. However, Brazil did ratify the Convention (Dec. 18, 2007) shortly before
the deadline for the submission of their Applicant City bid (Jan. 14, 2008). See
International Convention Against Doping in Sport, supra note 168; INT’L OLYMPIC
COMM., CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE: GAMES OF THE XXXI OLYMPIAD IN
2016 24 (2007), available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/
en_report_1213.pdf.
172. Chicago 2016, Applicant City, at 17.
173. 2016 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 163, at 21.
174. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 86.
175. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., IOC MARKETING: MEDIA GUIDE LONDON 2012 15
(2011) [hereinafter MEDIA GUIDE LONDON 2012], available at http://www.olympic
.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/London_2012/IOC_Marketing_Media_Guide_
2012.pdf.
176. OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE, supra note 101.
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ence, there are 5,600 broadcasting staff,177 and 20,000 credentialed
journalists.178  Due to the large number of media members con-
verging on a single country for a short period of time, and desire to
protect the investment made by its broadcasting partners, the IOC
wants to ensure that media members can carry out their jobs unen-
cumbered.  To this end, the IOC asks bidders whether the media
members would be subject to the local labor laws.  The IOC also
inquires into the state of restrictions on the import and export of
media material.
Labor law dominates the media question asked by the IOC.
Media members, numbering in the tens of thousands, and mostly
foreign-based, are required to work in the host country for several
weeks around the Olympic Games.  The imposition of labor restric-
tions by state regulation or by unions could prevent the media from
working at all in the country.  The IOC wants to prevent labor laws
from being a barrier and asks:
Would Olympic related personnel, especially the me-
dia, broadcasters, the OBS and their personnel, and tim-
ing and scoring services be subject to union regulations or
labour laws, and if so what special waivers will be intro-
duced to enable the OBS, rights holders and media to ful-
fil their professional responsibilities without being
constrained by the host country’s media reporting regula-
tions, labour laws, trade union agreements or regulations,
if any, with regard to reporting and filming in the Host
City or country.
Explain.179
This question was asked of Candidate Cities prior to 2020, and of
Applicant Cities in 2020.  Prior to 2016, the question simply read:
“Would broadcasters of the OBO [i.e., the current OBS], and their
personnel, normally be subject to union regulations or labour
laws.”180  After 2016, the prospect of special waivers was raised, and
in 2020 the reference to timing and scoring services was added.181
Thirteen of the twenty-one bidders replied that their labor laws
would not apply.  Paris, Rio, Annecy, and Munich promised to pro-
177. MEDIA GUIDE LONDON 2012, supra note 175, at 15.
178. The London 2012 Olympics in Numbers, THE INDEPENDENT (London) (July
11, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/the-london-2012-olym-
pics-in-numbers-2326316.html?action=gallery&ino=13.
179. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 95.
180. See, e.g., 2014 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 93, at 220.
181. See, e.g., 2016 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 97, at 228.
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vide exceptions or waivers to create a “flexible” environment for the
media to operate in.  Finally, Paris and Chicago stated that their
labor laws would apply to members of the media.182  Both Munich
and Annecy’s bids received somewhat of a rebuke by the IOC.  Both
cities agreed to adapt their laws to meet the requirements of the
Olympic Games.  The IOC stated that if either city “were awarded
the Games, it would be essential for these provisions to be imple-
mented.”183  It seems that the IOC is perhaps less patient than in
the past with bidders who do not explicitly state that their labor laws
do not apply.
Yet, beyond these blanket pledges that labor law will or will not
apply, the responses to the question begin to diverge.  Seven of the
bidders point out that their employment standards will apply to the
media.  Three of the seven are the Madrid bids, two are the Ameri-
can bids, two are the French bids, and one is from Austria.  This
total also includes two bidders, New York City and Salzburg, who
state that although employment standards would apply, labor laws
would not apply.184  Moscow’s bid strangely exempted foreign me-
dia from labor laws, but applied them to the Olympic Broadcasting
Services.185  Thus, while the majority of bidders exempted media
from labor laws, it is not a universal sentiment.
This question does have a definitional concern.  The question
uses a single term, “labor law,” which may be interpreted differently
in different countries.  While European states are more likely to
consider labor as a body of law that governs all forms of employ-
ment,186 Canada and the United States view labor law as specifically
referring to the right of employees to associated and collectively
bargain, with “employment law” as the regime that governs the
workplace more broadly.187  Thus, there could be confusion
182. Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 193; Chicago 2016, Candidate City,
Vol. 3, at 161.
183. 2018 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 85, at 31, 66.
184. New York City 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 175; Salzburg 2014, Candi-
date City, Vol. 3, at 208.
185. Moscow 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 147.
186. See Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion: Labour Law, EUROPEAN COMMIS-
SION, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&langId=en (last visited Jan.
31, 2016) (defining labor law as body of legislation that “defines your rights and
obligations as workers and employers,” and stating that EU labour law covers two
main areas: working conditions and informing and consulting workers).
187. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Reflections on the Declining Prestige of American
Labour Law Scholarship, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 789, 795, 798 (2002); compare
British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244 (referring only to
collective activity), with British Columbia Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 133.
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amongst bidders as to what, exactly, the IOC is looking for.  Some
bidders directly explain the different applicability of labor and em-
ployment law, while others seem to be less clear on this distinction.
For example, Salzburg stated that Austrian labor law was generally
not applicable, and that the contract of the home country of the
media member would govern.  Yet, “minimum requirements con-
cerning the legal entitlement of posted employees relevant to
wages, paid holiday and working times” would apply.188  Thus,
under a Canadian/American definition, “labor law” would not nec-
essarily apply, but “employment law” would apply.  A response such
as this may be an example of a bidder trying to make a distinction
between the two laws, or it may be the bidders trying to have it both
ways by appearing to be compliant with the IOC, and yet having
their particular laws apply.
The IOC asked Candidate Cities through 2018, and Applicant
Cities as of 2020, if there were any restrictions on the export of
media materials for consumption abroad, and on the import of me-
dia materials into the host country.  To do their job effectively, the
media needs to be able to, at a minimum, broadcast the images of
the Olympic Games around the globe.  Ideally, the media will also
be able to roam the area around the host city and country, report-
ing on cultural and other human-interest stories during the lead-up
to and duration of the Games.  The presence of the media becomes
problematic when potentially sensitive issues such as human rights
concerns, delays in Games preparation, and other things that the
hosts may not want to be brought to international attention, are
taking place.  To minimize the restrictions on the media, the IOC
asks bidders to: “Specify, if applicable, any restrictions or regula-
tions concerning the use of media material produced on the na-
tional territory intended principally for broadcast outside the
territory.”189
Of the twenty-one bidders asked this question, fourteen stated
they had no restrictions on the export of media materials.  The
seven bidders with restrictions actually said they had no restrictions,
and then went on to list restrictions.  These seven bidders repre-
sented only four cities: Madrid, Tokyo, Rome, and Baku.  Restric-
tions to export were: violations of intellectual property rights
(Madrid, Tokyo, and Rome),190 violation of tort law (Madrid and
188. Salzburg 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 208.
189. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 95.
190. Madrid 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 65; Madrid 2016, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 81; Tokyo 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 78; Madrid 2020, Applicant
City, at 74; Rome 2020, Applicant City, at 107; Tokyo 2020, Applicant City, at 76.
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Rome),191 violation of criminal law (Madrid 2016),192 and violation
of national security (Baku).193  The IOC noted that further clarifi-
cation would be required on Baku’s restriction.194
Just as a country may not want media to broadcast images from
within their borders to the outside world, the host country may also
be concerned with the effect on global media materials being
brought into their country.  There may be restrictions on such ma-
terial, and to that end, the IOC asks bidders if “there is any law
prohibiting or limiting by name or number the importation of for-
eign newspapers, periodicals or other publications.”195
Generally, the bidders stated that they had no limitations on
the importation of publications.  Ten of the twenty-one bidders sim-
ply stated that there was no prohibition on importation, without
any caveats.  There were four common importation restrictions
mentioned: material that violated public morals (seven bidders),
material that violated criminal law (six bids), material that violated
intellectual property law (five bids), and pornography (three bids).
Other reasons were mentioned once: incitation of war, protection
of youth, pro-Nazi party propaganda, and seditious material.  These
importation restrictions appear to be accepted by the IOC as rea-
sonable limitations on the importation of media materials, even for
a broad, vague category such as “public morals.”  In contrast to ex-
portation, discussed above, the restrictions that were mentioned
were spread across a greater number of cities bidding, with eight of
the seventeen cities mentioning restrictions on import, as opposed
to the four cities with restrictions on export.
F. Safety/Security
Olympic Games are “highly visible, ‘deeply symbolic’ occa-
sions.”196  This status establishes the Games as a valuable target for
disruption by a group looking to gain instant notoriety, the most
notorious of which was the hostage-taking of Israeli athletes in
1972.  But it is not just the threat of terrorism that must be ad-
dressed; various other forms of criminality such as fraud, kidnap-
ping, and human trafficking, as well as attempts by groups to use
191. Madrid 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 65; Madrid 2016, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 81; Madrid 2020, Applicant City, at 74; Rome 2020, Applicant City, at 107.
192. Madrid 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 81.
193. Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 81.
194. 2020 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 44, at 53.
195. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 95.
196. Malcolm N. MacDonald & Duncan Hunter, The Discourse of Olympic Secur-
ity: London 2012, 24 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 66, 67 (2013).
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the Games as a platform for advancing their political agenda, are
also considered and addressed by hosts.197
To meet these various security threats, the host cities and states
need to organize security amongst national police and emergency
forces, local forces, and even the military.  To ensure interoper-
ability amongst these disparate groups, the IOC asks bidding cities:
If necessary, is your government willing to make modifica-
tions to the laws, standards and administrative procedures
considered necessary within the legislative organisation of
the country in order to achieve an efficient structure and a
safety and security operation that is appropriate to the spe-
cial circumstances of the Olympic Games?
If so, what would be the timeframe for such a
procedure?198
This question was asked of Candidate Cities from 2012–18, as well
as of the 2020 Applicant Cities.  A similar question to this was asked
of Applicant Cities from 2012–18, without the references to “Stan-
dards and administrative procedures.”199  In regards to the latter
question, six of those twenty-six applicant cities did not mention a
willingness to introduce new laws.  That the IOC asked this ques-
tion in both the Applicant City and Candidate City stages until 2020
shows the importance of security to the IOC.
All of the bidders stated that they would modify their laws if
necessary.  Bidders often used evasive language such as “any legal or
regulatory measures that would prove useful or complementary will
be considered favourably,”200 while some were more resolute,
promising that if new legislation would be required, “appropriate
measures will be promptly implemented.”201  The secondary ques-
tion about the time frame was added for the 2020 bidders, with only
Baku and Doha providing some sort of time frame (a few months,
and a few days, respectively),202 Istanbul and Rome referring to ex-
pedited processes and “appropriate time frames,”203 and Madrid
197. Ying Yu et al., Governing Security at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 26 INT’L J.
HIST. SPORT 390, 392 (2009).
198. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 88.
199. See, e.g., INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2018 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCE-
DURE: XXIII WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES 84 (2009) [hereinafter 2018 CANDIDATURE
ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE], available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Re-
ports/EN/en_report_1451.pdf.
200. Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 53.
201. Tokyo 2020, Applicant City, at 58.
202. Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 61; Doha 2020, Applicant City, at 58.
203. Istanbul 2020, Applicant City, at 61; Rome 2020, Applicant City, at 87.
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and Tokyo not addressing the matter at all.  The reason that many
of the respondents may not be overly-enthusiastic about introduc-
ing new laws may be because they have already made claims that
their laws are sufficient to ensure an appropriate security operation
at the Games, discussed below.
G. Taxation
Similar to the temporary nature of employment created by the
Olympic Games, as seen above, there are also a number of tempo-
rary economic activities created by the Olympic Games, which may
be subjected to taxation such as the sale of goods, or employment.
Any taxation by the government would reduce the income received
by the IOC, or the OCOG.  As the IOC distributes much of the
funds received from the Games to the IFs representing the various
sports, taxation could also reduce the funds available to the devel-
opment of sport.204  As a practical bidding matter, a tax regime hos-
tile to the IOC would make a city a less appealing candidate.
As there were no questions that directly called for a change in
legislation by the host state, the analysis will proceed with a brief
examination of the general questions asked on taxation.  The IOC
begins its section on taxation by asking Candidate Cities to “provide
a statement from the competent authorities” that price-gouging,
particularly with hotel rates, will not occur before and during the
Olympic Games.205  The “competent authorities” leaves a lot of lee-
way for who these authorities may be, and many responses do not
touch upon public law authorities.  The key to these responses in-
stead is the use of signed guarantees from hotels, and other groups
that may engage in price gouging (e.g., taxi companies).  Only
three bids mention legislation: the two French bids mention they
have legislation in effect that allows the government to enact mea-
sures to prevent price-gouging,206 while the bid from Sochi
promises to enact legislation to prevent price-gouging.207  Some
bidders state or allude that they will rely on local regulations.
The other questions in the section focus specifically on taxa-
tion.  The IOC asks bidders to “describe the various types of taxes”
204. The IOC claims to distribute 90% of its revenues from the Olympic
Games to International Federations, National Olympic Committees, and the Or-
ganising Committees for the Olympic Games, while keeping 10% for administra-
tive costs for the IOC. OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE, supra note 101, at 6.
205. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 84.
206. Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 119; Annecy 2018, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 111.
207. Sochi 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 93; see also id. at 49.
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that bidders levy at all levels of government, which may impact the
Olympic Games.208  The types of taxes that are generally enumer-
ated by the bidders include: personal income tax, corporate income
tax, value added tax, customs duties, accommodation/entertain-
ment tax, and stamp duties.  There are other taxes that are specific
to individual bidders.  Bidders often state in this section that they
will reduce the impact of the tax burden on the IOC, or that they
will outright exempt the IOC from these taxes, whether through
legislation, regulation, or simply re-defining a transaction type from
one that is taxable to one that is not taxable.
Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games may also be
subject to taxation in the host country, and the IOC is curious
about the legal form of the OCOG.209  Particularly, the IOC wants
to know about the OCOG’s tax status, and the impact of the tax
status on the OCOG.  Bidders seem to have different names for
what appears to be the same thing.  For instance, Salzburg pledged
to establish the OCOG as an “Austrian limited liability company
(“Gesellschaft mit beschra¨nkter Haftung – GmbH”) with a non-
profit tax status,” while Rio proposed a “non-profit civil associa-
tion,” and Tokyo stated its OCOG would be a “public interest incor-
porated foundation.”210  Generally, the OCOGs are a not-for-profit
or a non-profit (10 bidders), or a public-interest organization (4
bidders).  Munich can likely be added to this latter category, but it
is unclear to the researcher.  Munich pledged to establish its OCOG
as a LLC, which would be considered a “special purpose enterprise”
or a non-profit limited liability company, and receive some tax ex-
emptions.211  London pledged to turn what would eventually be-
come LOCOG into a “Shell Company.”212  In regards to the impact
of tax due to the status of the OCOG, bidders generally grant re-
ductions or create exceptions to the taxes, easily done due to the
general proposals to establish the OCOG as a non- or a not-for-
profit.  However, sometimes there is specific legislation to ensure
that the OCOG would not be taxed.213
Not only might the IOC and OCOG be taxed for their activities
in the host country, but also for payments (e.g., royalties) made by
208. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 85.
209. Id.
210. Salzburg 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 104; Rio de Janeiro 2016, Candi-
date City, Vol. 1, at 121; Tokyo 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 114.
211. Madrid 2018, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 107.
212. London 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 101.  A “shell company” is one
that engages in business transactions, but does not have any significant assets itself.
213. E.g., Madrid 2016, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 123.
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the OCOG to the IOC.  The IOC thus wants to know if this would
be the case.214  Of the eighteen bids, ten specifically declared that
there would be no taxes.  Eight declared that there would be tax,
and all eight offered exceptions.  Three said that the OCOG would
cover the tax (Paris, Annecy, and Tokyo 2020),215 while the two
PyeongChang bids said that there would be no tax if the payments
could be classified as business income, not royalties,216 and all of
the Madrid bids said they would try to exempt the payments from
taxation.
Finally, in the section on “media,” the IOC asks bidders if the
media, namely the broadcasters or the Olympic Broadcasting Ser-
vices, would be subject to taxes for their work, specifically on their
production and equipment.217  Exemptions were made by all bid-
ders for broadcasting and for the importation of equipment to be
used for broadcasting.  Only Madrid’s 2020 bid stood apart, stating
that it would impose employment income tax on OBS members,
but only because the OBS has established its tax domicile in
Spain.218
H. Environment
Under the Olympic Charter, one of the roles of the IOC is “to
encourage sustainable development in sport and to require that the
Olympic Games are held accordingly.”219  The environment has
been considered the “third pillar of Olympism,” alongside sport
and culture, for over two decades.220  To fulfill these aims, the IOC
established a sport and environment commission in 1995,221 and
has worked with the United Nations Environment Program to im-
prove environmental standards at the Olympic Games.222  Despite
the IOC’s stated concern for the environment, and its mandate to
214. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 85.
215. Paris 2012, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 123; Annecy 2018, Candidate City,
Vol. 1, at 115; Tokyo 2020, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 72.
216. PyeongChang 2014, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 101; PyeongChang 2018,
Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 115.
217. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 85.
218. Madrid 2020, Candidate City, Vol. 3, at 125.
219. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 5, R. 2.13.
220. See, e.g., INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC MOVEMENT’S AGENDA 21: SPORT
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 33 (1999), available at http://www.olympic.org/
Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_300.pdf.
221. See The IOC, Sport and Environment Commission, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www
.olympic.org/sport-environment-commission (last visited July 16, 2012).
222. See, e.g., UNEP Sport & the Environment: UNEP and the International Olympic
Committee, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/
sport_env/Olympics_UNEP.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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ensure that the Games are environmentally sustainable, the IOC
does not ask bidders any questions that request or require that they
change their legislation to better protect the environment.  The
IOC instead asks bidders generally about the environmental im-
pacts of hosting, and potential plans for mitigating the environmen-
tal impact of the Olympic Games.  The plans the IOC asks about
are: (1) the use of environmental impact assessments, (2) green
building codes, and (3) compliance with national and international
agreements.
First, the IOC asks applicant cities whether “environmental im-
pact studies [have] been carried out on any of [their] proposed
venues and does legislation in [their] country require [them] to
carry out environmental impact studies? If so, at what stage of plan-
ning?”223  In the candidate city stage, the IOC requires that bidders
carry out environmental impact assessments to be submitted to the
IOC.224  Almost all of the cities affirmatively answered this question.
Only Borjomi and Baku stated that environmental impact studies
were not mandatory in their countries for the Olympic Games.225
While the IOC Working Groups for these Games did not comment
further on Borjomi and Baku’s absence of environmental impact
assessments, both of these countries scored very poorly in this cate-
gory.226  Conversely, although Doha had pledged to conduct envi-
ronmental impact assessments, the IOC responded saying “further
information will be required on how Qatari standards and systems
for environmental management and performance compare with
globally recognized standards.”227
Here, the value of analyzing bids, not cities, and doing so
across time, is demonstrated.  Baku seems to have taken some sort
of cue from its bid for the 2016 Games, and applied it to its 2020
bid.  For the 2016 Games, Baku had stated that despite environ-
mental impact studies not being mandatory outside of the oil indus-
try, environmental impact studies would be carried out to
“international standards as appropriate” in preparation for the
Games.228  Baku had increased their commitment to the environ-
ment in 2020, pledging to establish an Olympic Law that would re-
223. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 70.
224. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 81.
225. Borjomi 2014, Applicant City, at 49; Baku 2016, Applicant City, at 22;
Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 29.
226. 2014 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 137, at 59; 2016 WORKING
GROUP REPORT, supra note 81, at 58.
227. 2020 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 44, at 64.
228. Baku 2016, Applicant City, at 22.
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quire the application of a “Strategic Environmental Assessment
(SEA) to the entire Games masterplan and concept during the Can-
didature stage,” and conducting an environmental impact assess-
ment for all new venues in compliance with EU standards and
regulations.229
On the other hand, while Baku and Borjormi proclaimed an
absence of environmental impact assessments, some cities appeared
to be willing to go above-and-beyond the environmental require-
ments.  Leipzig promised to comply with the Eco-Management and
Audit Scheme, an environmental standards program developed by
the European Commission that automatically grants the participat-
ing site the ISO 14001 environmental standard.230  New York City
included remediation funds as part of its Olympic Games budget
for sites that could potentially create an adverse environmental im-
pact.231  PyeongChang pledged to include experts and non-govern-
mental organizations in the environmental process.232  Finally, all
European Union members were bound by EU environmental
standards.233
Second, the IOC began asking bidders about the application of
“green” building standards.  For the 2018 Games the IOC asked Ap-
plicant Cities whether they had any “existing standards for ‘Green’
building in [their] country?  What measures in terms of environ-
mental protection do [they] intend to apply in the construction/
refurbishment of Olympic-related infrastructure (including ve-
nues)?”234  In response, Annecy’s 2018 bid stated that all venues
would meet the Minergie P – Eco Label standard, equivalent to
LEED “Platinum” certification, while Munich and PyeongChang re-
lied on national standards.235  The IOC asked the candidate cities
for the 2018 and 2020 Olympic Games if they “intend[ed] to apply
any ‘Green’ building certification systems in the design, construc-
tion, refurbishment and operations of Olympic-related infrastruc-
ture[.]”236  The candidate cities responded that they would apply
various “green” building certification systems, such as the LEED sys-
229. Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 29.
230. Leipzig 2012, Applicant City, at 49.
231. New York City 2012, Applicant City, § 23.
232. PyeongChang 2018, Applicant City, at 45.
233. See, e.g., Leipzig 2012, Applicant City, at 49; Madrid 2016, Applicant City,
at 45.
234. 2018 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 199, at 86.
235. Annecy 2018, Applicant City, at 47; Munich 2018, Applicant City, at 67;
PyeongChang 2018, Applicant City, at 45.
236. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 82.
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tem, or other, similar, local systems.  The use of particular “green”
building standards may have been inspired by Rio’s response to the
question below regarding compliance with various regulations.  Rio
stated that it would follow LEED guidelines in construction, the
first bid in the sample to mention the standards in the legally-fo-
cused categories.237
Third, the IOC has asked candidate cities to guarantee that
construction work will comply with: “local, regional and national
environmental regulations and acts” and “international agreements
regarding planning, construction and protection of the environ-
ment.”238  All of the Candidate Cities provided the guarantees.  In
the IOC evaluations, the only remark of note was whether a bid had
signed on to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, which only the American bidders
had not.
I. Technology
The “media” category has demonstrated the significant impact
of broadcasting on the Olympic Games’ success.  Given the consid-
erable sums of money that broadcasters spend on the rights to show
Olympic events, it is imperative that the broadcasters can show the
events without disruption due to technical issues.  However, none
of these issues require intervention from public authorities beyond
administrative measures, and as such, the IOC does not ask any
questions that request or require changes to national legislation.
The IOC intends to ensure the ability to broadcast the Games
by requesting that bidders (Candidate Cities prior to the 2020
Games, Applicant Cities in 2020): “Provide (a) guarantee(s) from
the competent body(ies) that it (they) is (are) prepared to allocate,
manage and control the necessary frequencies for the organization
of the Olympic and Paralympic Games.”239  All of the bidders pro-
vided the guarantee, although complications arose with the Salz-
burg bid when the frequencies could not be provided free of
charge.  The OCOG had set aside $1.4 million, but the Evaluation
Commission felt that this was too low of an amount.240
The IOC is beginning to reach beyond frequency guarantees,
however.  As of 2020, Applicant Cities are asked to “[d]escribe the
role of the regulator and other governmental agencies in the devel-
237. Rio de Janeiro, Candidate City, Vol. 1, at 105.
238. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 82.
239. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 91.
240. 2014 EVALUATION COMMISSION, supra note 170, at 36.
49
Gauthier: Olympic Game Host Selection and the Law: A Qualitative Analysis
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
50 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 1
opment of new energy facilities and in the regulation of service
levels to clients.”241  The Applicant Cities provided the information
requested, identifying the regulator and their authority.  Baku used
this opportunity to speak about its investment in future energy
projects.242
J. Government Support
The IOC asks several final legal questions under the heading of
government support.  Government support is unquestionably vital
to an Olympic bid.  If the government does not support a bid,
which also includes financially backing the Games, the bid will
come to a swift end.  This was seen with Rome’s 2020 bid.  While
there have been Olympic Games that have relied largely on backing
from the private sector, notably the American Olympic Games in
Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City, the Olympic Games are
largely backed by public authorities.
The IOC asks Applicant Cities about “the status of support of
the national, regional and local governments for your bid and for
the organization of the Olympic Games.”243  All of the bidders
stated that they had support at all levels, with two exceptions:
Prague and Rome.  Prague’s bid communicated the history of the
bid, and of the approval by the Czech Olympic Committee, and the
mayor of Prague, but made no mention of national, regional, or
any other level of government.244  The IOC’s Working Group re-
sponded by expressing “concern about the degree of government
support.”245  The Rome bid also did not receive the support of the
federal government in the bid book.  In fact, because the federal
government publicly stated that it would not provide financial back-
ing for the Games, the bid was abandoned on the day before it was
to be submitted to the IOC.246  Similarly, the IOC asked candidate
cities to provide guarantees from their national, regional, and local
authorities in regards to their support.247  The guarantees were
granted.
241. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 92.
242. Baku 2020, Applicant City, at 69.
243. 2020 CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 97.
244. Prague 2016, Applicant City, at 11.
245. 2016 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 81, at 18.
246. See 2020 Olympics: Government Scuppers Rome’s Bid to Host, BBC.COM (Feb.
14, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17030257.
247. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 74.
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Second, the IOC asks Applicant Cities to guarantee the respect
of the Olympic Charter in two separate questions.248  All of the Ap-
plicant Cities provided the guarantees to both questions, however
two problems with the guarantees usually cropped up.  First, the
wording of the guarantee did not necessarily conform to the IOC-
required texts. This was the case for at least four bids: Chicago,
Jaca, Almaty, and Sofia.249  Similarly, Munich’s 2018 bid subjected
the guarantees to the Free State of Bavaria’s “constitutional compe-
tence and authority” and to the “limits of applicable laws,” which
led the IOC to request more unqualified support in the candidate
city stage.250  The second problem with the guarantees occurred
when a second country would act as a transportation hub or be
used to stage some events, and the IOC required that the second
country also provide the guarantees.  This was the case with Annecy
(using Geneva as a transport hub), and Salzburg (wanting to host
some events on German territory).251
The IOC doubled its efforts to secure “respect” for the
Olympic Charter by asking candidate cities to respect the Olympic
Charter, as well as the Host City Contract.252  Again, the Candidate
Cities provided their guarantees.  Unlike several problems with the
Applicant Cities, the IOC only mentioned problems with two guar-
antees from the Candidate Cities.  Similar to Munich’s Applicant
City bid, Madrid’s Candidate City bid stated that the guarantees
would be “within the scope of the [local and regional govern-
ment’s] powers,” and the IOC was concerned that “this qualifica-
tion may reduce their effectiveness.”253  Chicago’s bid was also
problematic, as the City of Chicago and the United States Olympic
Committee made “a number of legal submissions to the IOC re-
garding the application of the Host City Contract which were not
accepted by the IOC.”254
248. Id. at 97.
249. 2016 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 81, at 17; 2014 WORKING
GROUP REPORT, supra note 137, at 19, 20, 22.
250. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., XXIII OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 2018 WORKING
GROUP REPORT 12 (2010) [hereinafter 2018 WORKING GROUP REPORT], available at
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/2018_Working_Group_
Report_EN.pdf.
251. Id. at 13; 2014 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 137, at 18.
252. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 77.
253. 2016 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 163, at 66.
254. Id. at 12.
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VI. DISCUSSION
Following the analysis of the bids, answers to the above re-
search questions can be deduced.  The three research questions es-
sentially asked: (1) what issues of state public law arise in the host
city selection process, and how do bidders respond to the IOC’s
requests/requirements?; (2) are legal issues a central component of
a bid, or are they perhaps mere background concerns; and, (3)
what lessons might be learned for those advocating reforms to the
substance of the host selection process?  This Part will examine
these three research questions, as well as one that was not brought
up initially — how the IOC requirements change over time — in
addition to offering observations on the methodology used.
A. What Issues of State Public Law Arises in the Bids and
What Changes Does the IOC Require?
The answer to “what issues of a state’s public law arise during
the bidding process?” has been revealed through the course of the
above analysis.  Nine main categories of law were examined, in ad-
dition to one “general” catch-all category of disparate questions: (1)
“general” legal issues, (2) intellectual property rights/ambush mar-
keting, (3) customs and immigration, (4) anti-doping, (5) media,
(6) safety and security, (7) taxation, (8) environment, (9) technol-
ogy, and (10) government support.
Of these areas, the IOC made requests or required bidders to
implement or alter their laws.  There changes were in the catego-
ries of: intellectual property/anti-ambush marketing, customs and
immigration requirements, anti-doping rules, labor regulations for
media members, and security organization.  These twelve questions
provide a finite scope for measuring change that arise from the bid-
ding process.  It also suggests a finite scope for examining the legis-
lation enacted by the actual host cities.  However, other questions
concerning public law are asked by the IOC, and these may indi-
rectly induce legislative change.  While these twelve questions are
not the complete picture, they are the focus of the IOC’s efforts to
influence state law.
Notably, the IOC does not ask questions related to human
rights.  For instance, there is a question in labor law, but it only
relates to media members.  To put on an Olympic Games, tens of
thousands of jobs are created in construction, amongst other indus-
tries.255  Not asking for any information on labor standards is a sig-
255. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., TECHNICAL MANUAL ON WORKFORCE 32 (2005).
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nificant oversight for a large infrastructure project such as the
Olympic Games.  The only item to touch on labor relations was as-
surances in the 2016 and 2018 Evaluation Commission reports that
strike action would be low, due to positive relationships between
the government and labor unions.256  Perhaps the absence of such
a wide-sweeping employment law question is because the workers in
fields such as manufacturing are clearly covered by prevailing labor
laws.  Conversely, the media are part of a global workforce, and
their presence in the country is often transient.  Regardless, the
question on labor law and the media reveals that the IOC, prior to
Agenda 2020, shows little concern with general human rights condi-
tions in a potential host country.
B. Differences in Answers and Legal Issues as Qualifiers
The second research question asks whether legal issues might
prove decisive in the host selection process, or whether they are
mere “qualifiers” or “basic requirements” of a bid.  If a particular
criterion is important, there will likely be variability amongst the
bidders, as they attempt to distinguish themselves.  However, the
lower the variability, the less likely that the issues are decisive.
Generally, the responses to the questions are highly uniform,
with few deviations from the norm.  Even across cities that bid mul-
tiple times, the responses were similar.  The bids from Madrid,
PyeongChang, and Tokyo appear relatively stable in their re-
sponses.  This may be because these bids come from developed
states, or from countries that have recently held major sporting
events and are used to the legal requirements of the events.  An
outlier is the pair of bids from Baku, as it increased its environmen-
tal commitments from its 2016 bid to its 2020 bid.  This finding
supports a claim made by Caitlin Pentifallo and Rob VanWyn-
sberghe that bidders engage in a form of “mimetic isomorphism,”
where bids end up becoming homogeneous in an attempt to deal
with uncertainty and constraint.257
When a bidder does promise something outside of the “norm,”
it does not appear to be an asset to the bid.  Baku again is an outlier
here, given its promise to enact legislation to support the Olympic
Games in the first question addressed in this article.  Baku’s de-
256. 2016 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 163, at 30, 48; 2018
EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 85, at 68.
257. Caitlin Pentifallo & Rob VanWynsberghe, Blame it on Rio: Isomorphism,
Environmental Protection and Sustainability in the Olympic Movement, 4 INT’L J. SPORT
POL’Y & POL. 427, 428 (2012).
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tailed promises stood out from the generalizations of the other
bids.  This approach could have made Baku appear proactive in ad-
dressing their legal shortcomings, but could also lead to Baku look-
ing underprepared to host the Olympic Games.  There is no
indication from the IOC Working Groups that evaluated Baku’s bid
as to which case prevails, but the detail Baku provides is notable.
In instances where bidders promised more than others, the
promised element had a chance to become a requirement for fu-
ture editions of the Games.  As an example, Madrid’s 2016 bid men-
tioned cooperation in anti-doping investigations by officials.  In
2018, it became a requirement.  There may also be a similar case in
the environmental field, with Rio’s mention of LEED standards pav-
ing the way for the IOC to ask bidders whether and what green
building codes they would be using.  These assertions are somewhat
speculative however, as it is unclear why particular questions are
added to the IOC questionnaire, and access to the records that
might show reasons are under embargo.  It will be worthwhile to
see whether PyeongChang’s response that it will monitor the in-
ternet for potential ambush marketing attacks will be a standard
requirement in the future.
In general, the Evaluation Commission has cautioned against
going above-and-beyond generally:
There is a growing tendency for Candidate Cities to try to
go above and beyond IOC requirements in the bid phase.
Whilst such offers may appeal to a certain client group or
represent “nice to haves”, the future OCOG inevitably
finds itself facing additional costs to deliver services that
have not been requested by the IOC and thus represent
an unnecessary inflation of Games services.  The Commis-
sion wishes to draw attention to this as a matter of general
concern to the IOC.258
It would be useful to this study to be able to prove that a bid was
eliminated for failing to comply with the minimum requirements
for legal issues.  However, those bids that did have problems with
compliance, either with IOC requirements, or in relation to the
prevailing responses, tend to come from bids that would be seen as
“weaker” bids anyways.259
There may be a case to be made from the bidding to host the
2018 Youth Olympic Games (“YOG”).  The Youth Olympic Games
258. 2018 EVALUATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 85, at 6.
259. This applies to, for instance, Baku’s bid.
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were first held in 2010, for athletes aged 14–18.  These Games are
smaller in scale, and focus more on involving youth in sport and
culture than on competition per se.  The Youth Olympic Games are
bid on and hosted separately from the other Olympic Games, and
held in a cycle counter to the Olympic Games (i.e., in a year where
a Summer Olympic Games occurs, a Winter Youth Olympic Games
will occur).  The YOG bidding is roughly the same as the Olympic
Games bidding, although with fewer questions asked of the bidders.
When the city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, bid to host the YOG
in October 2012, the federal government was in the midst of an
election.  It was not until January 2013 that the Dutch government
provided the guarantees required for the bid.260  In the meantime,
the Working Group evaluating the bids labeled Rotterdam to be the
bid with the most risks to the IOC, placing Rotterdam behind Glas-
gow, Buenos Aires, Medellin, and Guadalajara.261  While the Dutch
government did deliver the guarantees following the report of the
Working Group, this untimely delivery likely hastened Rotterdam’s
failure to advance past the Applicant City stage.
Finally, prior to the 2020 Games, the IOC Working Group
weighed responses when awarding numerical scores to the bids.262
In 2018, the last year of weighted responses, the Working Group
used a category “Government support, legal issues and public opin-
ion,” and assigned the following weights: a) Government support
and commitment: 65%; b) Olympic Charter, legal aspects and anti-
doping measures/WADA compliance: 20%; c) Public opinion:
15%.263  This was but one of eleven separate categories (including
“overall concept”), meaning that, at most “legal aspects” was valued
at perhaps 1.5% of the bid.  The 2016 Working Group gave an even
lesser weighting to legal issues with a division of: a) Government
support and commitment: 70%; b) Olympic Charter, legal aspects
and anti-doping measures/WADA compliance: 15%; c) Public opin-
ion: 15%.264  The category as a whole received the lowest possible
weighting of the eleven categories, further reducing the value of
“legal aspects.”265  While such a weighting is not dispositive, it is
260. See Government to Underwrite Rotterdam Youth Olympics Bid, DUTCHNEWS.NL
(Jan 10, 2013), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/01/government_
to_underwrite_rotte.php.
261. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 3RD SUMMER YOUTH OLYMPIC GAMES IN 2018: RE-
PORT OF THE IOC WORKING GROUP 31–32 (2012), available at http://www.olympic
.org/Documents/YOG/2018/YOG_2018-Working_Group_Report-ENG.pdf.
262. 2020 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 44, at 7.
263. 2018 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 250, at 11.
264. 2016 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 81, at 16.
265. Id. at 9.
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evidence that legal issues are not necessarily of utmost importance
to a bid.
Given the above, it seems that legal issues are indeed what Per-
sson calls a “qualifier.”266  This does not undermine the importance
that law plays in the host selection process.  While there may not be
much room for differentiation, failure to meet the criteria could be
fatal to a bid.
C. Changing IOC Questions
Although not a research question prompted by the researcher,
it can be seen that not only do the bidders’ responses change to the
IOC’s questions over time, but that the IOC’s questions also change
over time.  There are particular reasons behind each question
change, perhaps due to a response from a bidding city, or the expe-
rience of an Olympic Games. Regardless of the reasoning, two pat-
terns emerge.
First, the IOC is asking more of cities at an earlier stage in the
process.  This is particularly visible in the 2020 host selection pro-
cess, as many questions were moved from the Candidate City stage
to the Applicant City stage.  The IOC has determined that “Bid cit-
ies generally have a greater understanding of the Olympic require-
ments and are better prepared at an earlier stage of the process.”267
Due to this increased level of preparedness, the IOC had deter-
mined that a re-balancing of the two phases would lead to better
risk assessment of the bids earlier on in the host selection process,
saving money and time for all parties concerned.268  Practically, this
shift means that bidders must do more, at an earlier stage, reducing
the room for error.
Second, the process is becoming more formalized over time.
This can be seen, for instance, in the IOC’s creation of pre-requi-
sites to bidding.  It seems odd to have a category of pre-requisites
when the IOC already has guarantees that they require of the bid-
ders.  In particular, the two legal pre-requisites take their cue from
questions that have already been asked of bidders in the past.
While the questions have normally been asked of Candidate Cities,
the IOC is now asking them of Applicant Cities, but not as guaran-
tees, but as pre-requisites.  Without access to the Executive Board
debates, it cannot be determined exactly why this decision was
taken.  This can also be seen, for example, in the question about
266. Persson, The Olympic Games Site Decision, supra note 22, at 31.
267. 2020 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 44, at 6.
268. Id.
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international agreements.  The IOC’s question has moved from an
emphasis on the execution of the Olympic Games to compliance
with the Host City Contract and the Olympic Charter.  It seems
strange that compliance with the legal instruments takes prece-
dence over the execution of the event itself.
With the shifting of questions from Candidate Cities to Appli-
cant Cities, and the increased formalism of the requirements, bid-
ders may be unduly burdened.  It is unclear whether the “invitation
phase” by the IOC can or will mitigate the impact of these addi-
tional requirements earlier in the process.
D. Lessons for Reformers
This study revealed that the IOC did not rely solely, or even in
a large part, on requiring guarantees from bidders to undertake
certain legislative reforms.  Of the forty-two questions addressed,
only eleven were ones that required guarantees from the bidders.
Instead, the IOC asked many questions that appeared to be simple
“information-gathering,” asking bidders what their plans were on a
particular topic.  Such information-gathering allows the IOC to
evaluate the quality of the bids in an ex post (after-the-fact) manner
as opposed to setting down requirements in an ex ante (before-the-
fact) fashion.  This can be seen for example, in the environmental
section.  The question asking bidders about green building stan-
dards allowed bidders to discuss the standards they would use, a bit
about the standards, and what it would mean for the Games.  How-
ever, the question requiring a guarantee that the bidders would fol-
low their own environmental laws did not allow for such a
discussion on what these laws might be, how they might relate to
the Games, and so on.  While guarantees are good for, say, the host
city contract, they are not as useful for the bidding process.
For those who call upon the IOC to establish requirements that
hosts respect human rights, it might be more useful, and more in
line with current IOC practices, to ask for information about
human rights protection.  On the one hand, it appears that requir-
ing a guarantee that, say, labor laws will be respected by contractors,
would likely lead to an answer which reads, “the relevant guarantee
is provided,” which leads to no value in evaluating the bid.  Instead,
it would be of greater value to ask a bidder what plans they have to
ensure contractors comply with labor laws.  Bidders might answer
with details on inspections, particularized labor tribunals, or other
programs to respect and enforce labor rights.  This way, bidders are
more likely able to differentiate themselves on the basis of human
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rights protection, and if they are required to enumerate particular
plans, then it is easier to hold them accountable.
Additionally, as noted above, bidders would submit informa-
tion that would go “above-and-beyond” the standard answers given
by other bidders, and may be incorporated into future require-
ments.  Thus, it may make more sense to put pressure on a bidder
from a developed country to “set the bar” with promises to protect
particular human rights that may be negatively affected by the
Olympic Games, and outline programs to do so.  Doing so in a bid
might show that such a thing can be asked of bidders, and put pres-
sure on the IOC to include the item as a future question of bidders.
E. Reflections on Methodology
In Part Two of this article, I examined prior studies that relied
on a quantitative approach.  However, the studies perhaps tried to
do too much, to predict the outcome of the host selection process.
In this article, I used a qualitative analytical approach, with a more
modest goal, to determine if a neglected area of the host selection
process was perhaps determinative of the bid.  I would argue that
the qualitative approach is as illuminating as a quantitative ap-
proach in examining bids to host the Olympic Games, particularly
in “intangible” areas.
One drawback of a qualitative analysis is determining whether
or not a question impacts public law sufficiently as to be included.
For instance, the question in the environmental section discussing
green building standards could be considered to be unrelated to
public law as the standards themselves may have nothing to do with
public law.  Yet, a question requiring a guarantee that national and
international accessibility standards will be applied for construction
of facilities (particularly for the Paralympic Games, which are
hosted shortly after the Olympic Games in the same city), and a
question on sustainable sourcing of products and services,269 were
deemed by this researcher not to sufficiently impact public law.
This is certainly a debatable inclusion or exclusion.  While this does
not detract from the overall evaluation of the bids, perhaps a more
stringent rationale for what questions would be included or ex-
cluded would be of use to future researchers.
Another potential drawback of using a qualitative approach is
disagreements over classification of answers.  However, this concern
is mitigated through the use of publicly-available documents, al-
269. 2020 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE, supra note 7, at 82, 150.
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lowing other researchers to support or refute my classifications and
analysis.  Throughout this research, however, I found the analysis of
the bids to be reasonably straight-forward, with not only answers
being similar, but the language used to be similar, which decreases
the likelihood of error of interpretation on my part.
Finally, for future research, it would be of value to obtain more
insight on how a bid is constructed.  In particular, information on
who is drafting the bid, and how they go about doing so might an-
swer some of the questions raised by the increasable similarity be-
tween the bids.  If the bids were largely drafted by the same groups
of consultants, or if the drafters of the bids simply used previous
bids from other cities as templates, or even “boilerplate,” that would
be valuable to know, particularly given the IOC’s concern over bids
being too similar.270
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This article has worked to serve two purposes.  First, this article
has sought to advance the current discourse about the host selec-
tion process, and legal issues surrounding the Games.  The analysis
of the bids submitted to host the Games has provided an under-
standing of how bidders react to the IOC requests, and has sup-
ported a finding that bids do not necessarily seek to differentiate
themselves, at least legally.  What this means for future bids is un-
certain, as the IOC significantly changed the host selection process
in July 2015, which will begin with the 2024 host selection.271
Whether it addresses concerns of bids being similar, remains to be
seen.
Secondly, this article has sought to understand how the host
selection process may be reformed to improve the Olympic Games,
particularly for those who may be affected by the Games.  In De-
cember 2014, shortly before the submission of this article, the IOC
passed its Agenda 2020 reforms.  Agenda 2020 made one particu-
larly notable recommendation: “to include in the host city contract
clauses with regard to Fundamental Principle 6 of the Olympic
270. See Robert Datnow, Breaking the Olympic Cycle: The IOC’s Bidding Dilemma,
SPORTSBUSINESS INT’L (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.sportbusiness.com/sportbusi-
ness-international/breaking-olympic-cycle-ioc%E2%80%99s-bidding-dilemma.
271. Robert Livingstone, IOC Drops Applicant Phase and Short List From 2024
Olympic Bid as Part of Sweeping Changes To Process, GAMESBIDS (Aug. 2, 2015), http://
gamesbids.com/eng/summer-olympic-bids/2024-olympic-bid-news/ioc-drops-ap-
plicant-phase-and-short-list-from-2024-olympic-bid-as-part-of-sweeping-changes-to-
process/.
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Charter as well as to environmental and labour-related matters.”272
A similar provision had already made its way into the bidding pro-
cess earlier that year as part of the bidding to host the 2022 Winter
Olympic Games, requiring that the bidder:
Provide (a) guarantee(s) from the competent authorities
stating that all venue construction and infrastructure de-
velopment projects necessary for the organisation of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games will comply with:
• Local, regional and national regulations and acts
• International agreements and protocols, ratified by
the Government of the Host Country or otherwise
applied in the Host Country (Please list) with re-
gard to planning, construction, protection of the
environment, health and safety and labour laws.273
While this seems to be a promising step forward, IOC, both in
its Evaluation Commission report, and through the President of the
IOC, Thomas Bach, has cautioned that “the IOC has to respect the
laws of a sovereign state,” the Commission report particularly in re-
gards to the question above.274  A statement such as this indicates
that the IOC may not work with great zeal to ensure that environ-
mental and labor rights are protected by the host state.
However, this research has shown that the IOC frequently re-
quires sovereign states to adjust their laws to accommodate the
Olympic Games.  When the IOC asks for a guarantee, or even some-
thing less than a guarantee, they usually get it, and when they do
not, the bidder is not selected to host the Games.  Even if the legal
requirements are “mere qualifiers” to host the Games, the reality is
that the hosts must then at least meet the legal demands of the
IOC.  This has been seen recently in the bidding process for the
2024 Summer Olympics, where the mayor of Boston declined to
sign the guarantee requiring that a host city will cover any financial
272. AGENDA 2020, supra note 11, at 15.
273. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 2022 CANDIDATURE PROCEDURE AND QUESTION-
NAIRE: XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 81 (2014), available at http://www.olympic
.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/FINAL_2022_Candidature_Procedure_and
_Questionnaire-FINAL.pdf.
274. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., REPORT OF THE 2022 EVALUATION COMMISSION 26,
72 (2015), available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/
ioc_evaluation_commission_report_sp_lr_eng.pdf; Thomas Bach: IOC Ready to
“Walk the Talk”, AROUND THE RINGS (July 30, 2015), http://www.aroundtherings
.com/site/A__52488/Title__Thomas-Bach-IOC-Ready-to-Walk-the-Talk/292/Arti-
cles; Thomas Bach Slams Politicians, ESPN (Feb. 2, 2014), http://espn.go.com/olym-
pics/winter/2014/story/_/id/10402263/ioc-thomas-bach-blasts-politicians-
shunning-sochi-olympics.
60
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss1/1
2016] OLYMPIC GAMES HOST SELECTION 61
shortfall.275  This decision, amongst others, led to the United States
Olympic Committee pulling its support for the Boston 2024
Olympic bid.
So long as the legal requirements are “mere qualifiers,” the
IOC will receive bids that sound similar in regards to legal require-
ments.  This is likely to be the case in regards to the environmental
and labor rights guarantee mentioned above, meaning that it may
be possible that little progress is made on this issue.  However, all
hope is not lost.  As discussed in Section VI.D, a particularly pro-
gressive bidder could make (and hopefully carry-out) a particularly
effective program that ensures environmental and labor rights are
protected, which may make its way into future bid requirements.
Even progress such as ensuring that intellectual property laws, dis-
cussed at the beginning of this article, are adapted to local circum-
stances and implemented appropriately, would be a strong start.
275. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Support Lacking, U.S.O.C. Pulls Bid, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2015, at B11.
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APPENDIX:  IOC QUESTIONS THAT IMPLICATE STATE-LEVEL
PUBLIC LAW ISSUES
Questions highlighted in bold indicate questions that request or require
a change in legislation by the bidder.
General/Miscellaneous
AC9.1 What are the legal obstacles, if any, to the organisation of the
Olympic Games in your country?
AC9.2 What are the existing laws, if any, in your country that relate to
sport?
AC9.3 Do you envisage the implementation of any news laws to facilitate
the organisation of the Olympic Games? Explain.
AC10.13 Does legislation in your country require you to carry out a referen-
dum to be held on a project such as the Olympic Games?
Could you be forced into a referendum by opponents to the
Olympic Games project?
If so, what would the legal implications be if the referendum was
negative?
If a referendum was required, this should be carried out prior to the
selection of Candidate Cities and the results of such a referendum
should be provided to the IOC.
AC (The city wishing to organise the Olympic Games) and (the NOC) declare
Appendix that any dispute arising during the period of the application of the
city in connection with the 2020 Candidature Acceptance Procedure
or its interpretation shall be definitely settled, to the exclusion of
the ordinary courts, by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lau-
sanne, pursuant to the Code of Sports-related Arbitration. Swiss law
shall be applicable to the dispute. The seat of arbitration shall be at
Lausanne, Switzerland, and the proceedings shall be conducted in
the English language.
CC4.5 Identify all the implications of national or international obligations
binding your country (e.g. national law, international treaties or
European Union rules and requirements) that could lead to a con-
flict with the obligations of the City, the NOC and the OCOG pursu-
ant to the Host City Contract and the Olympic Charter, including
obligations of a commercial, financial, fiscal or legal nature.
CC7.7 What is the current legislation in place regarding lotteries in gen-
eral and sports lotteries specifically?
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Intellectual Property/Ambush Marketing
CC4.3 The Candidate City and the NOC must ensure that the Olympic
symbol, the terms “Olympic” and “Olympiad” and the Olympic
motto are protected in the name of the IOC and/or that they have
obtained, or shall obtain from their government and/or their com-
petent national authorities, adequate and continuing legal protec-
tion to the satisfaction of the IOC and in the name of the IOC.
Describe the legal measures in force in your country to protect the
Olympic symbol, emblems, logos, marks and other Olympic-related
marks and designations.
What commitments do you already have in place from the govern-
ment of your country to such effect?
Provide a declaration from the government of your country stipulat-
ing that all necessary legal measures have been taken, or will be
taken, to protect the above-mentioned Olympic-related marks and
designations in the name of the IOC.
An equivalent level of protection must be guaranteed for the
Paralympic marks and the term “Paralympic” to the satisfaction of
the IPC and IOC.
CC7.3.1 Provide (a) written guarantee(s) from the relevant government
authorities confirming that the legislation necessary to effective
reduce and sanction ambush marketing (e.g. preventing competitors
of Olympic sponsors from engaging in unfair competition), and,
during the period beginning two weeks before the Opening Cere-
mony to the Closing Ceremony of the Olympic Winter Games elimi-
nate street vending, prevent un-authorized ticket resale, control
advertising space (e.g. billboards, advertising on public transport,
etc.) as well as air space (to ensure no publicity is allowed in such
airspace) will be passed as soon as possible but no later than 1 Janu-
ary 2018.
Customs/Immigration
AC9.6 Describe the regulations in force in your country regarding immi-
gration and entry visas.
AC9.7 Give precise details of the health and vaccination recommendations
or regulations for persons entering your country.
AC9.8 In accordance with Rule 53 of the Olympic Charter, the Olympic
identity and accreditation card is a document which establishes the
identity of its holder and confers upon the latter the right to take
part in the Olympic Games. Together with a passport or other offi-
cial travel documents of the holder, the Olympic identity and
accreditation card authorises entry into the country or the Host
City. It allows the holder to stay and perform his Olympic function
for the duration of the Olympic Games, including a period not
exceeding one month before and one month after the Olympic
Games.
The Olympic identity and accreditation card is delivered, under the
authority of the IOC, to persons eligible for accreditation.
Provide a guarantee from the relevant authorities that, notwith-
standing any regulations in your country to the contrary that would
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otherwise be applicable, accredited persons in possession of a valid
passport and an Olympic identity and accreditation card will be able
to enter into the country and carry out their Olympic function for
the duration of the Olympic Games and for a period not exceeding
one month before and one month after the Olympic Games, in
accordance with the Accreditation and Entries at the Olympic
Games  - Users’ Guide
AC9.9 What would the entry regulations be for members of the Olympic
Family to attend test events prior to the Olympic Games?
AC9.10 Describe the regulations in force in your country regarding the
entry of animals (i.e. guide dogs for the blind, horses) into your
territory.
AC9.11 Describe the process and average length of time required to apply
for and issue work permits for temporary entry of personnel to
work and domicile in the country and how this will be adjusted, if
necessary, in order to conform with the requirements referred to
above.
AC9.13 Specify, if applicable, any regulations concerning the import of spe-
cial products and equipment required by accredited persons to
carry out their duties at the Olympic Games: e.g. firearms and
ammunition (for sports competitions or security services), photo-
graphic and audio-visual equipment, medical equipment and prod-
ucts, computer equipment, foodstuffs etc.
AC9.14 What are the regulations with regard to the import, use and export
of goods required for test events prior to the Olympic Games?
CC4.8 Provide a guarantee stating that the temporary entry of certain per-
sonnel into your country for the organisation of the Olympic Games
will be authorised and that such persons will obtain appropriate
work permits in an expedited and simplified manner, without any
duties or taxes being payable.
CC4.9 Provide a guarantee from the relevant authorities, concerning the
import, use and export of goods, including consumables, required
by the IOC, IFs, NOCs and their delegations, broadcasters, written
and photographic press, sponsors and suppliers, free of all customs
duties, in order for them to carry out their obligations regarding the
celebration of the Olympic Games.
Anti-Doping
AC6.10 Does your country have a National Anti-Doping Organisation
(NADO)? Is this National Anti-Doping Organisation independent
or part of the NOC? Explain
Does your country have any legislation on doping? Explain.
What legislation is in place or will be implemented to allow coopera-
tion and sharing of information between the sports authorities and
the public authorities (police, customs) in relation to the fight
against doping and to implement the commitments of the Host
Country under the UNESCO Convention and the WADA Code?
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AC6.11 Provide a guarantee from the relevant national authority confirming
that
A. The (WADA) World Anti-Doping Code and the IOC Anti-Doping
Rules (which are based on the World Anti-Doping Code) which are
in force in 2020 will apply upon the occasion of the Olympic Games;
and
B. Should there be any conflict between, on the one hand, the World
Anti-Doping Code and the IOC Anti-Doping Rules and, on the other
hand, any other anti-doping rules applicable in your country, the
World Anti-Doping Code and the IOC Anti-Doping Rules shall take
precedence; and
C. the relevant authority(ies) of the host country will provide its
(their) full cooperation and support for the implementation of the
IOC Anti-Doping Rules at the time of the Olympic Games, in partic-
ular in relation to investigations and procedures regarding athletes’
support personnel or any other person involved in trafficking, or in
assisting in any way in relation to the use of prohibited substances or
prohibited methods, and that relevant laws are in place in order to
ensure the foregoing.
AC “False(name(s) of the duly authorised national authority) hereby
Appendix confirm(s) that (name of the country) has signed the Copenhagen
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport and ratified the UNESCO Con-
vention against Doping in Sport, Paris 19 October 2005, and that
legislation is in place (or will be in place by 7 September 2013) to
implement the commitments of the UNESCO Convention against
Doping in Sport.”
Media
AC9.12 Would Olympic related personnel, especially the media, broadcast-
ers, the OBS and their personnel, and timing and scoring services be
subject to union regulations or labour laws, and if so what special
waivers will be introduced to enable the OBS, rights holders and
media to fulfil their professional responsibilities without being con-
strained by the host country’s media reporting regulations, labour
laws, trade union agreements or regulations, if any, with regard to
reporting and filming in the Host City or country.
Explain.
AC9.15 Specify, if applicable, any restrictions or regulations concerning the
use of media material produced on the national territory intended
principally for broadcast outside the territory.
AC9.16 Is there any law prohibiting or limiting by name or number the
importation of foreign newspapers, periodicals or other publica-
tions?
Safety/Security
AC7.5 Does legislation permit a single management structure that will be
effective whatever the origin of the human and technical resources
that are used, and without functional or territorial restrictions?
65
Gauthier: Olympic Game Host Selection and the Law: A Qualitative Analysis
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
66 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 1
AC7.6 If necessary, is your government willing to make modifications to
the laws, standards and administrative procedures considered neces-
sary within the legislative organisation of the country in order to
achieve an efficient structure and a safety and security operation
that is appropriate to the special circumstances of the Olympic
Games?
If so, what would be the timeframe for such a procedure?
AC7.7 Is it possible to limit and exercise effective control over the use of
air space affected by the Olympic Games and, if so, how?
Taxation
CC6.3 Provide a statement from the competent authorities on how they
intend to ensure that there will be no price gouging before and dur-
ing the Games, with particular reference to hotel rates and related
services for anyone attending the Games, including non-accredited
spectators.
CC6.5.1 Describe the various types of taxes (direct and indirect, including
social contributions, fees and custom duties) which are currently
levied in your country from all levels of government (national,
regional and/or local) and which may have an impact should the
Olympic Games be hosted in your country.
CC6.5.2 Which legal form do you expect your Organising Committee to take
and what tax status do you expect the Committee to be subject to?
CC6.5.4 Would any taxes be levied in relation to sums of money paid by the
OCOG to the IOC (e.g. royalties)?
CC14.5 Would broadcasters or the OBO, and their personnel, normally be
subject to specific taxes for broadcasting work such as taxes on pro-
duction and/or equipment?
Environment
AC3.7 Have environmental impact studies been carried out on any of your
proposed venues and does legislation in your country require you to
carry out environmental impact studies? If so, at what stage of the
planning and construction process?
CC5.4 Provide (a) guarantee(s) from the competent authorities stating
that all construction work necessary for the organisation of the
Olympic Games will comply with:
Local, regional and national environmental regulations and acts
International agreements and protocols regarding planning, con-
struction and protection of the environment
CC5.5 Do you intend to apply any “Green” building certification systems in
the design, construction, refurbishment and operations of Olympic-
related infrastructure?
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Technology
AC8.13 Provide (a) guarantee(s) from the competent body(ies) that it
(they) is(are) prepared to allocate, manage and control the neces-
sary frequencies for the organisation of the Olympic and Paralympic
Games.
AC8.16 Describe the role of the regulator and other governmental agencies
in the development of new energy facilities and in the regulation of
service levels to clients.
Government Support
AC10.5 What is the status of support of the national, regional and local gov-
ernments for your bid and for the organisation of the Olympic
Games in your city/region?
AC10.7 Provide a covenant from the government of your country stating the
following:
“Name(s) of the duly authorised representative(s) hereby con-
firm(s) that the government of name of the host country
guarantees the respect of the Olympic Charter;
guarantees that it will take all the necessary measures in order that
the city fulfils its obligations completely; and
guarantees free access to and free movement around the host coun-
try for all accredited persons on the basis of a passport (or
equivalent document) and the Olympic identity and accreditation
card referred to in the Olympic Charter.”
AC10.9 Provide a letter of guarantee, signed by both your country’s NOC
and your city authorities, stating the following:
“Names of the duly authorised representatives hereby confirm that
the name of the host country’s NOC and name of the city authori-
ties will respect and comply with all obligations set out in the
Olympic Charter.”
CC4.1 Provide a covenant from all authorities concerned by your project of
hosting the Olympic Games guaranteeing the following:
The respect of the provisions of the Olympic Charter and Host City
Contract
The understanding and agreement that all commitments made are
binding
Taking the necessary steps so that the city fulfils its obligations
completely
Covenants must be obtained from the following authorities:
The government of your country
All local and regional authorities concerned by your project of host-
ing the Olympic Games
Standard text provided for this guarantee in the Model Guarantees
File.
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